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INTRODUCTION
During the last two decades governmental activity in the
United States has expanded greatly at all levels. A recent attempt
to catalogue functions performed and services rendered by govern-
ment produced a list of some 400 items, many of which include sub-
activities.1 The demands made upon local government since
the war by the backlog of capital projects and enlarged service re-
quirements have been unprecedented in volume and costliness. An
obvious concomitant is the need for additional revenues.
In the scramble for public revenue the position of local gov-
ernment is doubly difficult. Beyond the ever-present economic
aspects of taxation, the local unit, as the legal creature of the state,
must, by and large, assume public burdens imposed from above
and at the same time confine itself to such means of raising revenue
as the state makes available. It is a commonplace for a state legis-
lature to impose an additional burden as by requiring a three-
platoon in lieu of a two-platoon system in a fire department, with-
out concern over the means of paying the piper.2
The problem has been aggravated in a number of states by
constitutional limitations upon ad valorem taxation adopted during
the depression years. In a state like West Virginia, where the
limits are absolute, the effect, as to locally-rendered services, which
the community would not suffer to be curtailed, was state assump-
tion of some of the services, state subsidy of others, and a search
for new non-property tax local revenues to support the rest.3 Even
in Ohio, where the composite ten mill limitation upon all levies on
real property can be exceeded by a local taxing authority with
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1Chatters and Hoover, AN INVENTORY OF GOvERNmENTAL Acnvrris nT THE
UNTED STATEs (Municipal Finance Officers Association 1947).
2 Luhrs v. Phoenix, 52 Ariz. 438, 83 P. 2d 283 (1938); People ex rel. Mosier
v. Springfield, 370 I1l. 541, 19 N.E. 2d 598 (1939); State ex rel. Strain v. Houston,
138 Ohio St. 203, 34 N.Y. 2d 219 (1941).
3 See Sly and Shipman, Tax Limitation in West Virginia, in PROPRTY TAx
LnimATioN LAws, 77 et seq. (Pub. Admin. Serv. No. 36, 1934).
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electoral approval, special voted levies for both debt service on
bonds and current expenses have not, in most centers, begun to
reflect the increase in cost of local government. Some indication
of this is given by the fact. that the three Ohio cities between
250,000 and 500,000 population, as of the 1940 census, have the low-
est tax rates of the 23 cities in that population group.4 We are
witnessing in Ohio and other states the significant spectacle of
the incidence of a mounting local revenue burden being shifted
from property despite the demands of the federal and state govern-
ments upon other so-called tax sources. Portsmouth, Ohio, repre-
sents an interesting cross-current. A Portsmouth income tax
ordinance, adopted in 1948, was subjected to referendum by petition
backed by organized labor. The city fathers proposed as an alterna-
tive an additional ad valorem levy. The voters approved the special
levy. Council responded by repealing the income tax ordinance.
Local units other than municipalities have traditionally had
little recourse to non-property taxation. Ad valorem levies have
been their mainstay. That is still largely the case but there have
been significant developments. In the realms of education and wel-
fare one notes heavy state support of local agencies." Counties and
townships and various special function units as well have resorted
increasingly to direct service charges in such activities as garbage
collection. Except for the recent Pennsylvania experience, which
is yet to be discussed, power to levy non-property taxes has not,
however, been more than sparingly devolved upon such units.
Considering the country as a whole, aid from state and federal
governments, resort to service charges and the levying of additional
non-property taxes have all figured substantially in the effort to
pay for municipal services. With the first two sources of revenue
we are not primarily concerned in this paper. It is to be recognized,
of course, that the service charge device has important possibilities
beyond the so-called public enterprise area. It may be used in
connection with such matters as garbage collection. It has the ad-
vantage of being keyed directly to benefit and, in the case of public
enterprises involving substantial capital outlay, has been employ-
ed increasingly as a means of project financing by way of issuing
revenue bonds in anticipation of collection of project revenues. While
special assessments are employed largely to finance capital im-
4 Tax Rates of American Cities 1949, 39 NAT. M1N. REV. 17, 23 (1950).
5 Letter to the writers from Lowell C. Thompson, City Solicitor of Ports-
mouth, Ohio, dated Nov. 29, 1949. The Portsmouth Income Tax Ordinance was
Ordinance No. 81 (1948).
6 See, e.g., Abraham and Greeley, FDmAL AkN STATE Gnim Ts nT AID, Pmxr
IH (Cambridge 1947).
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provements, in some states they are used for current operating
purposes, such as street cleaning.1 The use of fees to cover the cost
of regulation under the police power has been stretched to the point
of providing funds for the general support of government. While
it is not easy to document, we are confident that this has not uncom-
monly been the case with parking meter charges."
The policy implications involved in seeking state and federal
aid as against imposing more local taxes are too-weighty for ade-
quate consideration in this introductory statement. We do venture
to say that there are occasions on which such aid to local govern-
ment can be strongly supported as a matter of policy. If it be as-
sumed that there is proper national or state interest in the perform-
ance of a local function on at least a minimum quantitative and
qualitative basis and if there are actually low spots in local ability
to meet the expense, the device of federal or state grants in aid does
rationally tend to meet the objective. There is such diversity, how-
ever, in the bases upon which state funds are allocated to local
government that it is difficult to observe any consistent strain of
policy.9 Expediency has played a dominant role m the matter. The
grant in aid is more sensitive to local need than a simple tax-
sharing program; the latter may channel money into a local unit
whose income is already adequate. 10 The former, moreover, may
exact matching of funds and, thus, keep local responsibility for
fund-raising in the picture.
There is an important body of opinion which supports the
thesis that the governmental unit charged with the expenditure of
funds should bear the responsibility for raising them. The logic
of this is that local units of government should have broader
powers of taxation than has been traditionally granted and should,
for the most part, be left to the exercise of that authority to raise
needed funds. At the time of the present writing the American
Municipal Association is waging a battle in favor of municipal
resort to admissions taxes. One A.M.A. spokesman has urged that
T Oro Gzr. CoDE §§ 3842-3852. For a general discussion see Rillhouse,
WHmm Crrns GET THm MoHEY 152-153 (Municipal Finance Officers Association
1945).
8 See Hillhouse, op. cit. supra note 7 at 89-93. THE Mu nCPAL YEAxwooK
1949, 437-439 (International City Managers Association 1949).
9 But see, N. Y. STATE FnrAcE LAw § 54. This law makes provision for an
annual state per capita allocation to each city ($6.75), town ($3.55), and
village ($3.00). Each local unit may spend the money as it deems best.
10 See the analysis of the Ohio situation in A STUmy OF TE TAX AND
R SvzIuz sri OF THE STATE OF Omo Arm rrs PoucAL SunSmioNs, Ch. 3
(Report of The Tax Commissioner to The Governor and the 97th General
Assembly 1947).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
the twenty per centum federal tax be so adjusted that it, plus any
municipal levy, would not exceed the present federal rate."1
While hard-pressed municipalities have been glad to seize
upon admissions and other levies of rather limited revenue poten-
tial, there undoubtedly has been, shall we say, poignant yearning
for a revenue mainstay other than the general property tax.12 New
York City in 1934 and New Orleans, a few years later, found relief
in the retail sales tax. Recently a swarm of California municipali-
ties have had recourse to the sales tax.'3 In other parts of the
country, notably Ohio and Pennsylvania, local income taxes now
enjoy the spotlight.
Tm "PmIADELn mA STORY"
The pioneer in the field of local income taxation has been the
City of Philadelphia."4 Pennsylvania does not grant constitutional
home rule to her municipalities; there is provision, however, for
what we may call statutory home rule.'" In 1932 the legislature,
through the adoption of the "Sterling Act," authorized the city
council of a city of the first or second class to levy taxes on persons,
transactions, occupations, privileges, subjects and personal prop-
"1 The American Municipal News, March, 1950, 3.
1 2 See, for example, the statement of Gilbert Burnett, Director of Law
of Louisville, Kentucky:
"We had long ago reached our constitutional limit on ad valorem taxes
We had tried practically everything. We still could not get along, with
increased demands on the city, and the lowered revenue."
"A scientific reassessment is a slow and expensive thing. Possibly basically
that is where we ought to go. We tried every character of license tax permitted
to us. But we said 'Why bite off these little hunks? Why not go at it whole
hog,' and that is what we proceeded to do." MuNrcnALrnEs AND THE LAW 2n
AcTioN 45-46 (National Institute of Municipal Law Officers 1949).
Criticism of the general property tax is not a new phenomenon. "The City
of Chicago is forced by the State of Illinois, through the Constitution, to exist
under an antiquated taxing system. This system, the general property tax, with
its principle of so-called uniformity, presses its thorns deeply into only one
form of wealth, real estate, and allows larger items of wealth, represented by
personal property, to escape. Such a system was long ago outmoded for urban
communities." Hodes, LAw Am TI MODERN Cit 21 (1937).
13 It has been reported that over 120 California municipalities had adopted
sales taxes as of Jan. 1, 1949. Campbell, The Experience of California Cities with
the Local Sales Tax, 23 MicH. Musuc. REv. 5 (Jan. 1950).
14 The first Philadelphia Income Tax was ordained by the Philadelphia
Ordinance approved Nov. 26, 1938. New York City enacted a local income
tax in 1934 which was repealed before it became effective. The rate of this
tax was set at 15 per centum of the income tax paid to the federal government.
Hillhouse, WHERE Crn:ES GET THEm MONEY 107 (Municipal Finance Officers
Association 1945). Prior to 1941 Montreal had a local income tax. Id. at 108.
I5 PA. CONST. Art. XV, § 1.
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erty within the limits of the city not subjected to a state tax or
license fee.16 The authority so conferred upon cities of the second
class expired June 1, 1935. Thus, the act, now applies only to
Philadelphia, the lone city of the first class. Philadelphia relied on
the Act in 1938 in levying a sales tax-' 7 Strong opposition of local
merchants led to repeal of the ordinance the following year.'
It was late in 1938 that Philadelphia first resorted to income
taxation by imposing a flat rate one and one-half per centum levy
on earned income. The validity of the measure was promptly test-
ed in a taxpayer's suit to enjoin its enforcement. The tax was up-
held.19 In January 1939 the ordinance was repealed.
In December, 1939, a comprehensive earned income tax or-
dinance was enacted.20 This ordinance deserves somewhat detailed
attention because it has served as a model for Toledo and other
income tax cities. The ordinance levied a tax of one and one-half
per centum on earned income. It applied to salaries, wages and
other compensation, and the net profits from business and other
activities of residents and non-residents of Philadelphia. Corpora-
tions were excluded. No personal exemptions were allowed, no
deductions were allowed against earnings of employed persons and
no attempt was made to tax investment income or capital gains.2 1
In a key administrative provision collection at the source was pro-
vided; employers were required to withhold and account for the tax
on salaries and wages. Collection was made a responsibility of the
Receiver of Taxes. The ordinance granted him rule-making and
certain investigatory powers. It made information gained by a muni-
cipal officer or agent under the ordinance confidential and imposed a
penalty for disclosure. Enforcement was supported by both civil and
penal sanctions. Provision was made for interest and financial
penalties to be imposed on delinquent taxpayers and for suit to
collect unpaid taxes. Penal sanctions took the form of a fine of $100,
enforceable by imprisonment if not paid in ten days, for each vio-
lation of the ordinance. The closing sections excluded persons and
16 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 4613 (Supp. 1949).
17 Green and Wernick, The Philadelphia Income and Wage Tax, in MuNicr-
PAL=s AND THE LAW 3n AcTioN 148 (National Institute of Municipal Law
Officers 1944).
18Ids
19 Butcher v. Philadelphia, 333 Pa. 497, 6 A. 2d 298 (1938). It is interesting
to note, however, that the court struck down the $1,000 basic exemption pro-
vided by the ordinance on the ground that it was contrary to the Uniformity
Clause of the State Constitution. PA. CONsT. Art. IX § 1.2 0 Philadelphia Ordinance approved Dec. 13, 1939. (This ordinance will be
referred to throughout this article as "Philadelphia Ord.").
2 1 Philadelphia Ord. § 2 set the initial rate of the tax and specified those
upon whom it was imposed.
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property beyond the council's power to tax and ordained separ-
ability.
The rate of the tax was reduced to one per centum after a time
to adjust it to revenue needs. In December, 1949, it was fixed at one
and one-quarter per centum.22 It has been an extremely effective
revenue-producer. Responsible authority has gone so far as to de-
clare unequivocally that the tax saved the city from bankruptcy.23
Administration of the Philadelphia ordinance has called for
hundreds of rulings by the city solicitor and much revising and re-
fining of the administrative regulations. 24 The measure has, more-
over, been subjected to very thorough scrutiny by the courts in a
series of cases. Down to this year the city had successfully beaten
off all substantial attacks upon the levy as an impost upon earned
income. Recently, however, the city has met with serious reverses in
attempting first to apply the earnings tax to investment income and
capital gains on the theory that the taxpayer was engaging in bus-
iness in producing this income 25 and later in attempting, by express
amendment, to extend the application of the ordinance to all income
not included within the meaning of "earned income."26 All that
need be added at this juncture with respect to these cases is that the
"state supreme court has interpreted that provision of the Sterling
Act which excludes municipal taxation of "a privilege, transaction,
subject or occupation or. • • personal property which is now or may
hereafter become subject to a State tax or license fee"27 very strictly
against the city. The effect appears to be to confine the Philadelphia
income tax largely to earned income. More particular reference will
be made to these recent cases as well as the other Philadelphia in-
come tax decisions at appropriate points in the discussion which
follows.
In 1947 the Pennsylvania General Assembly adopted the famous
Act No. 481, which extended to 3,600 of the 5,200 local units in the
commonwealth substantially the same broad powers of taxation
devolved by the Sterling Act upon Philadelphia. 28 Over 800 of the
2 2 The provision fixing the tax at one and one-quarter per centumwas up-
held in Murray v. Philadelphia, 71 A. 2d 280, 289 (Pa. 1950).2 3 AcT. 481: ITs FTsr Two YEARS oF OPERATiro 25 (Bureau of Municipal
Affairs, Department of Internal Affairs of Pennsylvania 1949).24 Hillhouse, W~m CrrEs GET THme MoNxY 105 (Municipal Finance
Officers Association 1945).
25 Breitinger v. Philadelphia, 363 Pa. 512, 70 A. 2d 640 (1950); Murray v.
Philadelphia, 363 Pa. 524, 70 A. 2d 647 (1950).
26 Philadelphia Ordinance approved Dec. 9, 1949, was invalidated, except
as to the provision increasing the tax rate (see note 22 supra), in Murray v.
Philadelphia, 71 A. 2d 280 (Pa. 1950).
27 PA. STAT. Am. tit. 53, § 4613 (Supp. 1949).
2 8 PA. STAT. AxNr. tit. 53, § 2015.1 et seq. (Supp. 1949) Lq Act 481 of 1947,
Pamphlet Laws 1145, as amended.
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3,600 eligible units have imposed in excess of 1,000 axes under the
act,29 but, of these, nearly 200 (largely school districts) levied
severance taxes on the mining of coal,30 a form of tax now expressly
denied them by a 1949 amendment to the act.31 Apart from
severance taxes, the bulk of the levies under the act have been (1) ad-
missions taxes, (2) per capita levies, (3) mercantile license taxes
on retailers and wholesalers measured by gross receipts, (4) taxes
on mechanical amusement devices, (5) deed transfer taxes and (6)
income taxes.3 2 Nearly 200 units, including a few cities, boroughs
and townships and many school districts, have levied flat rate in-
come taxes.33 Thus exercise of the power devolved has not been
vagrant. Whether the act heralds a new day in state-local relation-
ships is a question we shall pretermit for the moment.3 4
Following the lead of Philadelphia, six Ohio cities have levied
income taxes.35 Louisville, Kentucky, has a so-called occupational
license tax measured in terms of wages, salaries or business net
profits.36 St. Louis has an earnings tax37 based upon an express
statutory grant of power made after a broad home rule charter
provision on taxation was declared to fall short of authorizing in-
29 AcT 481: Irs FIRST Two YnARs OF OPERAxroN 2 (Bureau of Municipal
Affairs, Department of Internal Affairs of Pennsylvania 1949); TAXES LEVIED
UNm Acr 481, SuPP.EmENT-FEB. 1, 1949 To Nov. 15, 1949 2 (Bureau of Munici-
pal Affairs, Department of Internal Affairs of Pennsylvania 1949).30 AcT 481: ITs FIRsT Two Yrns OF OPERATiON 3 (Bureau of Municipal
Affairs, Department of Internal Affairs of Pennsylvania 1949).3 1 Pa. Act 246 of 1949, Pamphlet Laws 898, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 2015.1
et seq. (Supp. 1949). There has been evidence of judicial antipathy to severance
taxes since the decision in English v. School District of Robinson Township, 358
Pa. 45,55 A. 2d 803 (1947) which upheld the validity of Act 481. For a discussion
of the later cases see Rose, Pennsiylvanid's Experiment in Home Rule Taxation
as it Affected the Coal Industry, 11 U. OF PITTs. L. REv. 228 (1950).3 2 AcT 481: ITs Fms Two Ynns OF OPERATiON 4, 5 (Bureau of Municipal
Affairs, Department of Internal Affairs of Pennsylvania 1949).
33Id. at 4.
34 The Pennsylvania Bureau of Municipal Affairs has taken a very favor-
able view as to the statute. Id. at 1, 25.
3 5 Columbus Ord. No. 658 (1947); Dayton Ord. No. 16614 (1949); Springfield
Ord. No. 4741 (1948); Toledo Ord. No. 18 (1946); Warren Ord. No. 3839 (1949);
Youngstown Ord. No. 49349 (1948). (In these footnotes the local income tax
ordinances will be identified hereafter by reference to the name of the local
unit after the ordinance citation has been given once.)
Portsmouth Ord. No. 81 (1948) was repealed before it became effective.
See note 5 supra. The City of Garfield Heights, Ohio, does not levy an income
tax even though it is listed as a city which does levy such a tax in THE MusTci-
PAL YEAR Boox 202 (International City Managers' Association 1949). Letter to
the writers from Joseph L. Zelazny, City solicitor of Garfield Heights, Ohio,
dated Dec. 5, 1949.
aaLouisville Ord. No. 112 (1948) as amended by Ord. No. 165 (1948) and
by OrcL No. 6 (1949).
37 St. Louis Ord. No. 44678 (1948).
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come taxation.38 A Portland, Oregon, ordinance levying a license tax
akin to that of Louisville was defeated on referendum at the May
1950 primary.3 9 A proposed amendment to the home rule charter of
the City of Minneapolis, which, significantly enough, would have
authorized a graduated income tax was lost by a tie vote in
Council in 1948.40
HomE RuLE PowER nx O1--THE PREEmpTON DocTRMIE
In Ohio we must look first to the home rule amendment of the
state constitution as a possible source of municipal authority to
impose income taxes. It is clear enough that so far as counties and
other non-municipal types of local units are concerned there is no
direct constitutional grant of power to levy taxes of this character
and appropriate enabling legislation has not been enacted.
It should be observed at once that the Ohio cases down to 1948
have been very ably discussed in a previous number of this Jour=l
by C. Emory Glander and Addison E. Dewey.41 They will be re-
examined here only to the extent necessary to give the reader the
general picture and to permit of expression of certain views, which
differ from those of the authors of the previous article.
Article XVII of the Constitution of Ohio, popularly known as
the municipal home rule amendment, by Section 3 confers upon
municipalities "authority to exercise all powers of local self-gov-
ernment and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local
police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict
with general laws." While there is substantial basis, as an original
matter, for interpreting the qualifying clause, which appears at the
end of this Section, to modify both grants of power made by the
Section,4 2 the settled interpretation is that the clause qualifies only
the second grant of power.43
When the home rule amendment was adopted in 1912, there
was already to be found in the constitution a provision command-
38Mo. REv. STAT. Am., §§ 7780A-7780.12 (Supp. 1949) constitutes express
provision for St. Louis to levy its tax. The abortive tax levied under the
St. Louis Charter provision was invalidated in Carter Carburetor Corp. v.
St. Louis, 356 Mo. 646, 203 S.W. 2d, 438 (1947).
3 9 The [Portland] Oregonian, May 22, 1950, Sec. 2, Page 10, Col. 3, reports
the final vote at 31,840 for and 85,241 against the proposal.4 0 Letter to the writers from John F. Bonner, City Attorney of Mnneapolis,
Minnesota, dated December 9, 1949.
4 1 Glander and Dewey, Municipal Taxation: A Study of the Pre-emption
Doctrine, 9 Omno ST. L. J. 72 (1943).
42 See the discussion of this matter in Fordham and Asher, Home Rule
Powers in Theory and Practice, 9 Omo ST. L.J. 18, 23-25 (1948).
43 See State ex rel. Arey v. Sherrill, 142 Ohio St. 574, 578-579, 53 N.E. 2d
501, 504 (1944).
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ing the General Assembly to restrict the power of municipalities
to levy taxes, impose assessments, borrow money, contract debts
and lend credit.4 4 The draftsmen of Article XVIH evidently thought
that the positive grants of power in Article XVII might be deemed
unaffected by the older restrictive provision, for they expressly
wrote into the home rule amendment a Section 13 which author-
izes the legislature to pass laws to limit the power of municipalities
to levy taxes and incur debts for local purposes. If the mandate
of the earlier restrictive provision had been expected to survive
the adoption of Article XVHI, what would have been the occasion
for including in Article XVII a permissive section simply confer-
ring power upon the General Assembly to limit municipal tax
levies? This point has not been rationalized in the cases; it has
simply been held, without explanation, that Article XVIII did not
repeal by implication the earlier restrictive section.45
The first case in which the state supreme court was called up-
on to decide whether municipalities have home rule power to levy
non-property taxes reached the court in 1919.46 The question pre-
sented was whether Cincinnati had authority to impose occupa-
tional excises upon persons pursuing osteopathy and various other
occupations. There was no similar state tax. The court upheld the
levy. The opinion did not provide a clear explanation for the result.
At one point it was broadly laid down that, aparb from the provi-
sions of Section 13 of Article XVIH, the home rule grant in Section
3 of Article XVII conferred upon municipalities as complete tax-
ing power as the General Assembly had received under the broad
grant of legislative power made by Section 1 of Article H of the
Constitution. Here the court signflicantly pointed out that the grant
of all powers of local self-government would be an empty affair
unless it embraced the power of taxation. A little further on, how-
ever, the opinion intimates that the legislature might impliedly
limit municipal taxing power by invading a particular field of tax-
ation itself. The opinion closed with a pronouncement that unless
and until the state itself invaded the field or expressly interdicted
the exercise of the power, the authority of a municipality to utilize
subjects of taxation as in that case must be upheld. Since the state
had not imposed a tax on occupations the reference in the opinion
to limitation by implication was obiter. It was unfortunate, however,
that once having referred to it the court did not explain why the
mere levy of a similar state tax would necessarily constitute a
44 OMo CONST. Art XI, § 6.
45 State ex Tel. Osborne v. Williams, 111 Ohio St. 400, 145 N.E. 542 (1924);
Berry v. Columbus, 104 Ohio St. 607, 136 N.E. 824 (1922); State ex rel. Toledo
v. Cooper, 97 Ohio St. 86, 119 N.E. 253 (1917).
46 State ex rel. Zielonka v. Carrel, 99 Ohio St. 220, 124 N.E. 134 (1919).
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limitation by implication upon municipal taxing power.
It is not too clear whether the court was suggesting that the
restriction by implication would be based on an interpretation of
the state tax statute or would be explained as a limitation implicit
in the very home rule grant of taxing power. The language used
seems to be a little more suggestive of the former, although we are
not told how it is that a state tax statute can be said to interdict
municipal taxation when all it does as a matter of positive enact-
ment is impose a state levy without any mention of municipal
taxation.
We find it very interesting that in the first case in which the
incipient preemption doctrine was actually applied the supreme
court did not proceed on the theory that the state tax law was to
be interpreted as limiting municipal taxation, but embraced the
theory that the taxing power conferred by the home rule grant
simply did not extend to any field of taxation occupied by the
state.47 There was no mention of Section 6 of Article XIII or Sec-
tion 13 of Article XVIII. The rationalization of the decision is
largely embodied in the statement that the state should be deemed
to have preempted the field "to the end that the sovereignty of the
state may be superior to that of any of its subdivisions in a mat-
ter so essential to that sovereignty as that of taxation."48 This, we
suggest, is a highly vulnerable rationalization. It is by way of say-
ing that the court is interposing to preserve state supremacy even
though the legislature has two independent provisions of the con-
stitution upon which it could draw to achieve that objective. Cer-
tainly the legislature would not be without strings to its bow if
either the mandate of Section 6 of Article XIII to "restrict" muni-
cipal taxing power or the permissive authority of Section 13 of
Article XVIII to "limit" municipal power to levy taxes is broad
enough to enable the General Assembly substantially to forbid or
interdict municipal taxation in this or that field.
There has been little discussion of the content of the words
"restrict" and "limit" as used in these provisions of the constitu-
tion. It is clear enough that legislative control is not confined to
ad valorem taxes. Property tax limitations are spelled out in the
taxation article of the constitution.49 It would be anomalous, more-
over, to accord the express reference to "taxation" and "taxes" in
the limitation sections a narrower application than the power to
tax drawn from the general grant of home rule power.
47 Cincinnati v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 112 Ohio St 493,
147 N.E. 806 (1925).
48 Id. at 499, 147 N. at 808.
4 9 Omo CONST. Art. XII, § 2.
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Do the terms "restrict" and "limit" refer to the placing of ceil-
ings on rates or amounts or do they embrace the idea of prohibition
or exclusion? In the initial home rule non-property tax case the
question was mentioned but there was, of course, no occasion for
a judicial commitment on the point. ° The later cases simply take
it for granted that the second meaning is the true one and offer no
explanation. In ordinary usage both "restrict" and "limit" are rel-
ative terms; 5 1 here they are given an absolute quality. The Gen-
eral Assembly on this basis may expressly deny any form of taxa-
tion, with the possible exception of property levies, to a munici-
pality. The logical extreme of this is the negation of home rule
power to tax, since if the legislature may deny a city or village one
form of taxation it may proscribe another.
Hardly a month after the court embraced the theory that the
concept of state preemption was an implicit limitation in the home
rule grant,52 Section 13 of Article XVIII was invoked and limita-
tion by implication applied. 53 The City of Cambridge had imposed
a "license fee" on the owner of a motor vehicle of one-fourth of the
state excise tax and provided that the net proceeds be used for
street maintenance. The state tax law required half of the receipts
of the state tax to be returned to the municipality of origin for
street repair purposes. It will, thus, be seen that there was present
in this case the additional factor of state tax-sharing with munici-
palities. Whether that makes a substantially stronger case for im-
plying a limitation is a point which we shall reserve for the
moment. What strikes us as especially noteworthy about the case
is the early and unexplained shift in theory.
Questions were bound to arise as to whether an existing state
tax actually covered the same area as a municipality proposed to
occupy. It is easy to perceive that questions of this character are
likely to lead us into an inquiry into the economic incidence of
state and municipal taxes. This type of problem was first presented
to the supreme court in 1931. 54 The case, however, was one where
legal form rather than economic burden governed. The state, of
5(1 State ex rel. Zielonka v. Carrel, 99 Ohio St. 220, 228, 124 N.E.
134, 136 (1919). State ex rel. Toledo v. Cooper, 97 Ohio St. 86, 119 N.E. 253
(1917) related to home rule power to levy property taxes; the Carrel case
was the first involving non-property taxation under the Home Rule Amend-
ment.
51 WEBSTm's ITERNAnONAL DICTIONARY (2d Ed. 1948) defines "restrict"
in part as follows: "1. To restrain within bounds; to limit; to confine; as, to
restrict words to a particular meaning . . ." The same work defines "limit" in
part as follows: "2. To apply a limit to, or set a limit or bounds for..52 See note 47 supra.
53 Firestone v. City of Cambridge, 113 Ohio St. 57, 148 N.E. 470 (1925).
54 Cincinnati v. Oil Works Co., 123 Ohio St. 448, 175 N.E. 699 (1931).
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course, had a gasoline tax. The City of Cincinnati adopted an or-
dinance imposing an occupational excise of $100 per year upon
operators of gasoline filling stations in the city. The city insisted
that the gasoline tax was actually imposed upon the consumer; it
certainly was passed on to him in economic fact. The court, how-
ever, interpreted the gasoline tax statute to impose the tax upon
the seller, that is, the filling station operator, and it accordingly
held that the state had preempted the field to the exclusion of the
municipal tax. It will be seen that it was considered enough to
establish peemption that the gasoline tax was technically imposed
on the dealer, although it was obvious that he would pass it on to
the consumer and that the city license covered activity beyond
selling gasoline. Whether the dealer could effectively shift the bur-
den of the municipal excise was an entirely different matter. The
marked difference in the measure of the two taxes is obvious.
Fifteen years later the court had before it a case in which the
respective state and municipal taxes were clearly imposed on dif-
ferent subjects of taxation and different taxpayers but the measure
was substantially the same.55 The state sales tax expressly exempt-
ed sales by public utilities of utility services and commodities but
applied to their sales of merchandise and appliances. At the same
time, the three per centum state tax on the gross receipts of public
utilitie3 excepted receipts from sales which were subject to the
sales tax. In other words, those two state taxes were integrated.
The City of Youngstown came along and adopted a tax ordinance
which imposed a tax of two and one-half per centum on the net rate
charged for natural gas, electrical energy, water and local tele-
phone service and equipment furnished in the city. The ordinance
required that the tax be added to the consumer's bill and the
amount collected along with the charges for service. The pertinent
statutes provided that substantial portions of both the sales tax
and gross receipts tax on public utilities be allocated to municipal-
ities. Again the preemption doctrine prevailed and the municipality
went empty-handed. The court was impressed by the legislative
design to avoid "double taxation" of gross utility receipts, whether
from ordinary utility service and commodities or from merchan-
dise and appliances. This, it was thought, warranted the inference
that the General Assembly was, by a combination of sales and gross
receipts taxes, preempting the field. It was not considered neces-
sary to explain that preemption occurred notwithstanding the fact
that the sales tax was imposed on the consumer whereas the gross
receipts tax was imposed upon the utility. It was apparently deemed
5 5 Haefner v. City of Youngstown, 147 Ohio St. 58, 68 N. E. 2d 65 (1946).
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enough that the taxes were "similar," that each was measured by
gross receipts. Nothing was said as to whether, as an economic fact,
the gross receipts tax was passed on to the consumer.
The Youngstown case 56 did not clarify the preemption doctrine
although it assuredly extended its application. About the only
concession which had been made to municipal autonomy down to
the time of that decision was a ruling, not previously mentioned
herein, to the effect that a state charge imposed as an incident to a
regulation under the police power and not to produce revenue for
the support of government is not enough to constitute state pre-
emption. 7 Apart from this, it would appear that no matter how
nominal a state tax it will be deemed automatically to exclude
municipal taxation on the same person and technical tax bases,
and even of municipal taxes not technically imposed on the same
persons and subjects if they be measured by the same economic
factors. Thus, in the Youngstown case, the state gross receipts tax
was imposed on public utilities and the subject of the tax was the
privilege of doing business; gross receipts were the measure of
the tax. Under the city tax the consumer was the taxpayer and
the privilege of buying and using utility service and commodities
was the subject of the tax. The measure of the tax, however, was,
in effect, the same as that employed in the state levy.
If similarity in the measure of state and municipal taxes is to
be enough to ground preemption that alone would serve to becloud
municipal taxation of the income from intangibles since the state
property tax on productive intangibles is measured by reference to
their income yield.5" Yet, in theory at least, the state levy is clearly
a property tax.
The intangibles tax situation suggests another problem. Sup-
pose, instead of covering a so-called field of taxation, whether
heavily or lightly, the state merely camps on a part of the area as
by taxing income from investments but not earned income. Should
this be deemed to exclude local taxation of earned income? Surely
"preemption" does not carry so far as to preclude the local levy.
Messrs. Glander and Dewey's study of the preemption doctrine
led them to the conclusion that the decisions employing it have
5 6 The Youngstown case referred to throughout this article is the case
cited in note 55 supra.5 T Loan Co. v. Carrel, 106 Ohio St. 43, 138 N. E. 364 (1922).5 8 Omo GEN. CoDE H 5323, 5388, 5389. See Angell v. Toledo, 153 Ohio St.
179, 186-187, 91 N.E. 2d 250, 253-254 (1950) (concurring opinion) for an able
discussion of this problem by Taft, J. See, a Sriin or THE TAx AND REvnu
Ssr= or rm STATE or Omo AND ITs PoLrrIcA SuBnvisioN 19-21 (Report of
The Tax Commissioner of Ohio to The Governor and The 97th General
Assembly 1947) for a summary of the state tax on intangible personal property.
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been eminently correct.5 9 They were content to insist that the Gen-
eral Assembly may by express provision permit municipal taxation
in an area occupied by the state.60 It is not evident that there could
be any serious question about the latter proposition. The preemp-
tion doctrine itself, however, is another matter. What it does, we
suggest, is turn the constitutional pattern around.61 The constitu-
tion grants municipal taxing power subject to legislative limita-
tion; the preemption doctrine denies municipalities access to all
non-property forms of taxation employed by the state unless the
legislature expressly opens the door to them.
Both theories employed in the cases are vulnerable. It is not
necessary to labor what has already been said about the implicit
limitation theory, which is dedicated to the cause of maintaining
state supremacy. The express legislative power of limitation ap-
pears adequate for that purpose. This much may be added-while
it is not lightly to be supposed that the people would give local
units taxing power co-eval with that of the state government there
is nothing in the nature of things to preclude their doing so. It is
not to be forgotten that we are talking about a constitutional grant
of municipal home rule.
The other theory must be supported, if at all, as a matter of
statutory interpretation, since it stems from the constitutional
provisions empowering the legislature to limit municipal taxation.
The legislature, let us say, imposes an admission tax in order to
raise funds to meet current expenses of the state government. The
statute makes no mention of municipal taxation. Certainly the prime
concern 'is the positive objective of financing state business. On
what basis can it realistically be said that the statute does more,
that it is also a law to limit municipal taxation? What intrinsic or
extrinsic aid to interpretation points toward such a secondary pur-
pose? Raising state revenues is one thing, limiting municipal tax-
ation to prevent abuse and effect coordination with the over-all
revenue system of the state is another. It seems scarcely more far-
fetched to say that here are two subjects which should be dealt
59 Glander and Dewey, Municipal Taxation: A Study of the Pre-emption
Doctrine, 9 OHo ST. .J. 72, 88, 89 (1948).
60 Id. at 89, 90.
61 Professor Knight, one of the delegates to the Ohio Constitutional Con-
vention of 1912 who contributed most to the content of the Home Rule Amend-
ment, pointed out in the Convention that it was desired to reverse the rule
that municipalities have only those powers granted by the legislature, so that
by direct constitutional grant they would have the power to do things which
were not denied to them. 2 PRocEminGs mD DmATES, OHmo CoTSrr=uoTip
Co vE nol 1433 (1912). For an analysis of the action of the Convention in
regard to the Home Rule Amendment see Fordham and Asher, Home Rule
Powers in Theory and Practice, 9 OHIo ST. L.J. 18, 19-24 (1948).
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with by separate statutes in view of the single subject matter clause
of the constitution, 2 than to interpret the hypothetical amusement
tax statute to preclude a municipal amusement tax.
A statute levying a tax goes into effect immediately and is not
subject to referendum. 63 A law authorizing or limiting local taxa-
tion is subject to referendum and cannot take effect until the expir-
ation of 90 days after filing in the office of the Secretary of State.64
If a statute levying a state tax contained express provisions limit-
ing local taxation would not the latter be subject to referendum?"
If they would, does not the preemption doctrine have the effect of
imposing immediate limitations on municipalities without fear of
referendum-something that could not be done by express enact-
ment? If there is any force in these points, they provide an addi-
tional basis for questioning the preemption doctrine.
The bugaboo of double taxation is not at all alarming. Is it
double taxation, in the first place, for local, state and national gov-
ernments to tap the same revenue source, each for its own pur-
poses? The term will have more content if we confine it to cases
where one government digs a second time into particular taxpayer
pockets for the same purposes. Even if we choose to label concurrent
state and local taxation of the same subject "double taxation" that
does not, per se, confront us with legal questions. The same property
may be subject to ad valorem taxation by a plethora of overlap-
ping units of government. Almost equally commonplace is non-
property taxation of a subject by a number of independent levying
authorities. If, as a matter of policy, the General Assembly of Ohio
should choose to minimize this sort of thing it would have the
authority to do so, and that without benefit of the preemption
doctrine.
In the Youngstown case emphasis was laid upon the legislative
intent to avoid double taxation of utility receipts. That there was a
design to avoid simultaneous sales and gross receipts taxation by
the state measured by the same gross receipts was evident. That is
a substantial objective in itself. The fact that not a word was said
about municipal taxation provides a much more compelling basis
for concluding that it was unaffected than the levy of integrated
state taxes affords for determining that municipal taxation is
banned.
62 0mo CONST. Art. II, § 16.
03 OmIo CONST. Art II § Id.
64 State ex rel. Keller v. Forney, 108 Ohio St. 463, 141 N.. 16 (1923).
65 OxIo CoNsr. Art. II § Ig requires any initiative, supplementary or ref-
erendum petition to be presented in such a manner that there may be a
separate affirmative or negative note on each section. It is apparent that a
difficult problem would be raised if an express limitation upon municipal
taxation were placed in the same section which levies a tax.
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Should the fact that a state tax law provides for sharing the
tax revenues with municipalities be deemed -to weight the scales
in favor of preemption? Our answer is "No." Consider certain
variations in the tax-sharing pattern. Suppose the sharing was with
counties or some other non-municipal type of local unit. The tax-
sharing would add little, if any, force to the, fact of a state levy
-since it would be without municipal relevance. Assume state allo-
cation of receipts from a state tax to a particular muncipal purpose
and that a municipality proposes to resort to a similar levy for
a different purpose. It will be recalled that the situation in the
Cambridge case presented a municipal tax for the same purpose
and it is of interest that the closing sentence of the opinion read:
"No municipality has power to levy such a tax in addition to that
levied by the state for similar purposes."60 That was a stronger case
because the General Assembly was making the state levy serve the
particular municipal end in view. This, however, is not a very sat-
isfying distinction. A municipality might obviate it by earmarking
the proceeds of its tax for a different purpose and drawing more
heavily on the general fund, if need be, to finance the object aided
by the state levy.
In brief, the problem of interpretation is more difficult where
tax-sharing is involved, particularly where the allocation and a
municipal levy are for the same purpose, but the case for preemp-
tion is still not convincing. The legislature can, with relative ease,
articulate a policy of limitation by express provision. Why is there
not more reason to infer from silence a want of purpose to preempt
the field than to imply from the state levy a policy not merely of
limitation but of complete exclusion of municipalities from the
field?
The present preemption doctrine is a very blunt instrument.
It operates to exclude a municipality from a particular tax field
even where the state levy is nominal, where the state levy in law,
but not economics, burdens the same class of persons and, at least
in some cases, where the classes of taxpayers are legally different
but either the measure or the economic incidence of state and muni-
cipal levies are much the same. If, on the other hand, the courts
were to leave the burden of correlating state and municipal taxes
to the legislature the job could be done with deliberation and what-
ever precision and refinements were deemed desirable. Affirmative
measures by the municipalities would be calculated to prod the
legislature into action defining the respective areas of state and
municipal taxation. Under the preemption doctrine legislative in-
ertia works against the municipalities; if they desire to impose
66 Firestone v. Cambridge, 113 Ohio St. 57, 67, 148 NJ.. 470, 473 (1925).
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levies similar to state taxes they must get what amounts to en-
abling legislation. This is not home rule; it is traditional pre-1912
legislative supremacy.
The preemption doctrine is not realistic; it is not sensitive to
the fact that all taxes are imposed on people and that government
simply varies the incidence by its choices of tax subjects and meas-
ures. Thus, the adoption of property tax limitations is calculated to
redistribute the burden on us taxpayers but can hardly be relied
upon to keep down public expenditure. To say that a municipal-
ity may not act because the state has invaded the field is to explain
a result by resort to what is anything but a clearly-defined idea.
Taxation is a pretty arbitrary business at best. Are we not delud-
ing ourselves to talk in tones of finality about a given tax preempt-
ing a field of taxation when what it does is seize upon a particular
human relationship or pattern of relationships as a funnel through
which to draw revenue from persons?
We come now to the contention that the constitution preempts
the income tax field for the state and, thus, municipal income tax-
ation is entirely excluded without regard to whether the state has
levied an income tax. It is necessary to look to the constitutional
background.
There can be little doubt that the General Assembly had the
power to levy an income tax under the Constitution of 1851. The
broad grant of legislative power made by Section 1 of Article II
renders true of Ohio the familiar theory that state legislative pow-
er is plenary except as limited. What, then, was the occasion for
the 1912 amendments which expressly authorized the taxing of in-
heritances and incomes? 67 Doubtless, the explanation is that it was
thought necessary to amend the constitution in order to empower
the legislature to levy graduated inheritance and income taxes. In
1895 the Ohio Supreme Court had held invalid an inheritance tax
law which taxed estates of larger value at higher rates on the entire
valuation than smaller ones.68 The act was considered in conflict
with the equal protection clause of Section 2 of Article I of the Con-
stitution. While the crude form of graduation employed was a far
cry from making the rates progressively higher upon higher brackets
of the tax base and, thus, taxing all corresponding brackets
alike, the case seems to have caused concern about the permissi-
bility of any type of graduation.
The 1912 amendments did not, however, stop with authorizing
graduation. They proceeded to require that at least half of state
income and inheritance tax proceeds be returned "to the county,
school district, city, village, or township in which said income or
67 OHO CoNsT. Art. XII, §§ 7, 8.
6 8 State ex Tel. Schwartz v. Ferris, 53 Ohio St. 314, 41 N.E. 579 (1895).
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inheritance tax originates, or to any of the same, as may be provided
by law. ' 69 What effect, if any, does this allocation provision have up-
on municipal taxing power? The journal of the constitutional con-
vention does not record any reference to the point or any discus-
sion, for that matter, of the provision. A separate section authoriz-
ing state excise, franchise and severance taxes, also added in 1912,
does not require sharing with local units.
In the opinion in, State ex rel. Zielonka v. Carrel,7 ° the initial
case upholding home rule power to tax, there was a dictum that by
implication from the allocation clause municipalities are clearly
without power to levy an income or inheritance tax. No further
rationalization was offered. The supposed implication is by no
means clear to us. The matter can be put this way-the p ople have
said to their representatives in the legislature: "you may impose
income-and inheritance taxes and graduate the rates but if you do
so you must share the proceeds with local governments." The tax-
sharing feature is, in terms, simply a limitation upon state taxation.
The delegates, as has already been noted, chose to deal expressly
Cand in a more appropriate place with the subject of municipal tax
limitation.
It is significant that the tax-sharing clause does not require
sharing with municipalities. The clause, in effect, tells the legisla-
ture it may share with counties, for example, to the exclusion of
municipalities located within their boundaries. Are we to say that
since the legislature might or might not, entirely at its discretion,
share with municipalities, the clause must be read as a limitation
upon the home rule grant of municipal taxing power?
What has been said thus far with respect to the Ohio problem
was written prior to the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio in
Angell v. The City of Toledo,71 announced on March 8, 1950, in
which the Toledo tax on earned income was upheld. Mr. Angell,
who resided in the county outside the corporate limits of Toledo,
was employed in Toledo.72 He sought to enjoin enforcement of the
tax. The primary question in the case was whether Toledo had
authority to provide for the imposition of an income tax on earned
69 OHIo CoNsT. Art. XII, § 9.
70 99 Ohio St. 220, 228, 124 N.. 134, 136 (1919).
71153 Ohio St. 179, 91 N.E. 2d 250 (1950).
7 2 The court pointed out that the ordinance was in effect when the plaintiff
commenced his employment in Toledo and concluded that therefore, plaintiff's
contract of employment was not impaired. The contract clause objection does
not strike us as formidable in any case. A contract is conditioned by existing
power to tax, just as is property ownership. Collection at the source does not
obscure this basic idea; it is hardly a difference of substance that the taxing
authority does not wait for one to have his wage envelope in hand before
exacting tribute.
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income. The majority opinion, written by Judge Turner, took note
at the outset that the power of the General Assembly, unlike that
of the Federal Congress, is plenary except as limited. The grant of
home rule powers to municipalities did, in effect, limit state sov-
ereignty to the extent of the sovereign authority conferred upon
municipalities. The court recognized that the power so conferred
upon municipalities embraced the power to raise revenue.
The opinion does not attempt extended rationalization in re-
jecting the contention that the income tax provisions of the consti-
tution operated per se to preempt the field. Judge Turner simply
dismissed the dictum in the Carrel case as obiter, pointing out that
if the legislature enacted an income tax it would have to do so
within the restrictions of Sections 8 and 9 of Article XII of the
constitution and reiterated the doctrine of statutory preemption by
saying that a municipality could levy an income tax in the absence
of a state levy preempting the field. There was obviously no occa-
sion to re-examine the statutory preemption doctrine.
It is significant that Judge Taft thought it necessary to write
a separate opinion7 3 in the Angell case to make it clear that statu-
tory preemption was not involved. The second paragraph of the
syllabus laid it down categorically that the state had not preempted
the field of income taxation authorized by Sections 8 and 9 of Article
XII of the constitution and that the General Assembly had not,
under authority of Section 13 of Article XVIII or Section 6 of
Article XIII of the constitution, passed any law limiting muni-
cipal power to levy and collect income taxes. All that it was neces-
sary to determine was that the legislature had not acted in such a
way as to deny to a municipality power to levy the Toledo type of
income tax on earned income. While Judge Taft was careful to say
that state occupation of a small part of a field of taxation does not
necessarily indicate a design to exclude municipalities from the
rest of it, he wanted to make it clear that the case had no real
bearing on the question whether the legislature had preempted
parts of the income taxation field by, for example, adopting a state
excise tax, a state franchise tax and a state intangibles tax. Even
if the Toledo tax had overlapped such state levies, Mr. Angell did
not have standing to assert the invalidity of the Toledo tax on that
account since there was no preemption so far as earned income
was concerned and the ordinance would not stand or fall as a unit
because the court would give effect to the separability clause.
The separate opinion of Judge Taft serves to point up afresh
some of the difficulties of the preemption doctrine already discuss-
ed in this paper. He was quite understandably accepting the
T3 See Angell v. Toledo, 153 Ohio St. 179, 186, 91 N.E. 2d 250, 253 (1950).
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doctrine as gospel. The very matters with which he was concerned
in his opinion, however, emphasize to us the unsatisfactory char-
acter of this doctrine as a device for marking out respective areas
of state and municipal taxation.
At the came time that the city fathers of Toledo received the
glad tidings about their income tax the Dayton commissioners
heard the bleak word that their income levy had been invalidated
for want of electoral approval. 74 In 1945 the voters had added a
Section 171 to the Dayton charter, the heading or guide line of
which reads as follows: "Limitation of the total tax rate which may
be levied without a vote of the people for all of the purposes of the
municipality." The first six paragraphs of the section, true to the
heading, relate unmistakably to ad valorem taxes and to no other
kind of levy. They deal with ad valorem tax rates in terms of mill-
age and control the use of the over-all maximum millage for debt
service, permanent improvements and general fund purposes. The
seventh paragraph reads:
Unless authorized and approved by a vote of the elec-
tors conformably with the general laws of this State, the
City Commission shall levy no tax outside of the limita-
tions set forth in this Section. Provided, however, that the
City Commission shall annually levy, to the extent neces-
sary, outside the limitations provided in this Charter and
by general law a sufficient sum to pay the interest, sinking
fund and retirement charges on all bonds and notes of the
City of Dayton heretofore or hereafter lawfully issued,
the tax for which by general law or by this Charter has
been or shall be authorized to be levied outside of tax
limitations.
In a brief per curiam opinion the court expressed doubt as to
whether the first sentence of this paragraph related solely to ad
valorem taxation. The doubt was resolved against the income tax
ordinance largely in reliance upon the rule that tax laws are to be
strictly constructed against the levying authority. Actually, the
only thing in all of the eight paragraphs of Section 171 to afford
support for this conclusion is the absence of the modifying word
"ad valorem" before "tax" in the first sentence of the quoted par-
agraph. That sentence, however, is hardly less clear without them.
All that went before related to ad valorem tax limitations and the
provision under scrutiny forbids a tax outside those limitations
unless approved by a vote of the people. The only kind of tax with
respect to which limitations of that character have any relevance
is an ad valorem levy; it would be incongruous to speak of levying
an income, admissions or occupational license tax, for example,
74 Zimmer v. Hagerman, 153 Ohio St. 187, 91 N.E. 2d 254 (1950).
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"outside of" ad valorem tax limits. It is apparent that Section 171,
and particularly its seventh paragraph, was drawn with an eye to
the restrictions upon ad valorem taxation set out in Section 2 of
Article XII of the constitution. Finally, the proviso in the seventh
paragraph of Section 171 is addressed to ad valorem taxes to pro-
vide for debt service.
In sum, the doubt which troubled the court is so fully dispelled
by the context that, to use the familiar parlance of statutory inter-
pretation, the section was free from ambiguity in this respect.7 5
The governing body of the city is left in the unhappy position of
being unable to impose any tax whatever, other than ad valorem,
without electoral approval. A referendum is compulsory, not mere-
ly voluntary or optional. On May 23, 1950, Dayton voters approved
an income tax substantially the same as the original Dayton levy.
STATE PREEMPTION IN PENNSxmVANIA
In Pennsylvania the concept of preemption has been written
expressly into the Sterling Act and Act No. 481 of 1947. The orig-
inal statute in each case ordained that the local authorities to
which they pertain should not have authority to levy and collect
any tax on a privilege, transaction, subject or occupation or per-
sonal property which was then or might thereafter become sub-
ject to a state tax or license fee.76
So long as Pennsylvania local units acting under one or the
other of these two statutes confined their income levies to earned
income, they did not run afoul state preemption. In December 1949,
however, the City of Philadelphia so amended its income tax or-
dinance as to provide for taxation of non-earned income from any
source whatsoever which was within the legal power of the city to
tax.7 7 It was broad enough to apply to corporations as well as
individuals.
In February 1950 two suits were entertained in the original
jurisdiction of the state supreme court, the object of which was to
7 5 While this is not the place to undertake a critical evaluation of rules of
interpretation in the nature of presumptions, it is hardly amiss to stress that
those rules are, at best, but court-made aids to interpretation which, if used
unimaginatively, may obscure instead of reveal statutory meaning. It is not
convincing simply to invoke such a rule without careful analysis of the
language of the charter provision in relation to its purpose. To illustrate, the
guide line of the provision was a part of the proposal approved by the voters
as a charter amendment. Thus, it should have been considered in attempting
to resolve the asserted ambiguity. See Fordliam anl Leach, Interpretation of
Statutes in Derogation of the Common Law, 3 VAND. L. Rlv. 438 (1950).
7 0 p. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 4613 (Supp. 1949) (the "Sterling Act"); Act
481 of 1947 § 1, Pamphlet Laws 1145.
77 Philadelphia Ordinance approved Dec. 9, 1949.
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enjoin enforcement of the ordinance.78 One suit was brought by an
individual and his wife and the other by a corporation. A number
of parties were allowed to join in the attack upon the ordinance by
intervention. It was urged that the ordinance was not valid as to
various classes of income and in every instance the court sustained
the attack. The general theory upon which the court proceeded was
that the Sterling Act banned municipal taxation of a "thing" or
"subject" taxed by the state. It should be particularly noted that
the emphasis was upon the "subject" of a tax.
The individual plaintiffs received dividends from domestic
corporations which paid a state capital stock tax and from foreign
corporations which paid a franchise tax. To sustain the conclusion
that the income and corporate taxes were imposed upon the same
subject the court treated the capital stock tax as, at once, a levy
on corporate property and on the stock in the hands of shareholders
and the income tax as an imposition on the property producing the
income, that is, the stock. The franchise tax was placed on a foot-
ing with the capital stock levy. It was declared that when a cor-
poration pays dividends out of the property on which the capital
stock tax has been paid the city may not tax the dividend income
to the stockholders because it would be taxing the same subject as
the state had taxed. One can understand a line of thought which
treats corporate income in a broad sense as corporate property,
but the way the court finds identity of subject here is to say that
the city was, in effect, taxing the stock of the stockholders. The
opinion does not suggest that the city was taxing corporate prop-
erty.
We run into this same confusionin connection with the next class
of income which was involved in the case. The individual plaintiffs
had received income from corporations which paid the state excise
tax measured by their net income. The court insisted that it would
look to reality rather than to the label "excise." It had no better
explanation, however, for determining that the municipality could
not tax the income than to say that the state excise was paid out
of corporate property and would become a preferred lien on that
property if not paid when due. It is far from clear what this dem-
onstrates since any tax on a corporation is paid out of some kind
of corporate property. The question remains whether, as in the case
of the capital stock tax, the city was taxing the same subject when
it taxed an individual's income from stock and the state imposed
an excise on the privilege of doing business and used corporate net
income as the measure of the tax.
When it came to the income of the individual plaintiffs from
78 Murray v. Philadelphia, 71 A. 2d 280 (Pa. 1950) (two cases).
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real estate, there was no basis for invoking preemption; the state
had not levied a property tax. The city lost just the same. The ex-
planation was that the income tax was, in effect, a tax on the real
estate itself and the state had by separate enactment made provi-
sion for local taxation of property. The court cited the largely dis-
credited Pollock79 case for the proposition that the tax on the in-
come from land is a tax on the land itself. It took no note of the
Federal Supreme Court's repudiation, in 1937, of the notion that to
tax income is the same as taxing the source. In New York ex rel.
Cohn v. Graves the Court sustained the application of a New York
income tax to rents received by residents from out-of-state real
property.8 0 Harlan F. Stone, perhaps our greatest tax judge, wrote
the majority opinion. The following passage is particularly per-
tinent:
"Neither analysis of the two types of taxes, nor consideration of
the bases upon which the power to impose them rests, supports
the contention that a tax on income is a tax on the land which
produces it. The incidence of a tax on income differs from that of
a tax on property.""' Yet the Pennsylvania court insists that it is a
principle of economics that a tax on income produced by property
is a tax on the property itself. The court carried this thought to the
point of declaring that even if the Sterling Act purported to author-
ize such a levy it would be unconstitutional as a violation of the
uniformity requirement of the state constitution.
8 2
GRADUATION OF RATES
In the two leading local income tax states, Ohio and Pennsyl-
vania, there are legal clouds over progressive levies. The Pennsyl-
vania constitutional requirement of uniformity of taxation is not,
as in most states, confined to ad valorem taxation, but applies to
"all taxes," including local income levies. The state supreme court
invalidated the $1,000 personal exemption under the original Phil-
adelphia ordinance on this ground.8 3 This bears scant promise that
the court would sustain graduated levies.
We have already seen that an old Ohio case, invoking the equal
protection clause of the state constitution, was deemed to call for
79 Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 158 U. S. 601 (rehear-
ing 1895).
80 300 U.S. 308 (1937). Counsel for the city in the second Murray case
were at pains to point up the Cohn case to the court. Brief for Defendants,
pp. 9, 14, Reply Brief for Defendants, p. 7, Murray v. Philadelphia, 71 A. 2d 280
(Pa. 1950).
81300 U.S. 308 at 314.
82 Murray v. Philadelphia, 71 A. 2d 280, 287 (Pa. 1950).
83 Butcher v. Philadelphia, 333 Pa. 497, 6 A. 2d 298 (1938).
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constitutional amendments in 1912 to permit the legislature to levy
graduated inheritance and income taxes.8 4 Since these amendments
apply only to state levies and since municipalities have no specific
constitutional grant of power to levy any sort of income tax, there
remains a question as to whether they can impose progressive
rates. It is elementary that the equal protction clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment does not preclude graduated state income tax
levies. It is not evident why the Ohio provision should be interpreted
to do so. Were graduated taxation in its modem guise of different
rates for different brackets of income now put to the judicial test the
old case should be overruled or distinguished.
PERSONS AND INCOiME SUBJECT TO THE TAX
Individuals
RESIDENTS AND NON-RESIDENTS. One of the principal reasons
for resort to income taxation is to compel the "daylight citizen" to
pay toward the support of those services and that protection which
he enjoys in the locality where he is employed. Even if an income
tax is adopted for other reasons, the revenue possibilities of taxing
those non-residents who are employed or engaged in business or
professional activity within the city are immediately apparent. All
of the municipal income tax measures examined in the preparation
of this paper tax the income of non-residents as well as residents.8 5
That a local unit of government may be given jurisdiction to
tax its own residents is too clear to require extended comment. If
its authorization is sufficiently broad, the local unit may use as a
tax base all of the income earned by its residents without regard to
the place where it is earned. With the exception of the Louisville,
Kentucky, "occupation" tax all of the local income taxes studied
do so impose the tax upon their residents as such.80 In the case of
a general function local unit, an adequate tax nexus between the
taxing unit and the taxpayer is clearly present. The resident tax-
payer has available for his use the "benefits" and "protection" pro-
vided by the local unit. In return the local unit may require finan-
cial support by taxation.
A local unit in levying a tax on the income of non-residents is
in a position analogous to that of a state taxing the income of non-
84 See note 68 supra.
8 5 School districts in Pennsylvania, however, are on a different footing.
Act 481 of 1947, § lA5 as amended by Act 246 of 1949, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,
§ 2015.1 (Supp. 1949) specifically prohibits school districts from levying income
taxes on the salaries or other income of non-residents.
86 Louisville Ord. § 1 imposes the tax only on those who are "engaged in
an occupation, trade, profession, or other activity in the City."
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residents and must stay within the limits of Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process of law which are applicable to the states.8 7 State
taxation of this character is a commonplace.
In the recent landmark case, Angell v. Toledo,8 8 the Supreme
Court of Ohio upheld the validity of the Toledo earnings tax as
applied to a salary earned in the city by a non-resident. The court
readily concluded that there was jurisdiction to tax the non-resi-
dent's earnings within the city because the municipality had ren-
dered benefits in the form of a place to work and protection for the
non-resident. Wisconsin v. Penney Co.,8 9 which was cited in the
opinion, supports the result but actually goes well beyond the facts
presented in the Angell case. The Penny case dealt with a Wiscon-
sin tax "for the privilege of declaring and receiving dividends, out
of income derived from property located and business transacted"
in Wisconsin;90 the dividends involved were actually declared by a
Delaware corporation at its principal office in New York and the
stockholders may or may not have been residents of Wisconsin.
The Court held that the levy was, in effect, an income tax on earn-
ings within Wisconsin and that the granting of the privilege of
doing business to the foreign corporation supported the tax on the
income earned from the business.91 It is to be noted, as emphasized
in the dissenting opinion,9 2 that the formal subject of the tax was
an out-of-state transaction and if the levy was to be regarded as a
tax on income it amounted to an impost on non-resident stock-
holders.
The Philadelphia income tax is applied to all wages, salaries
or compensation for work done or services performed in the city.
93
If a non-resident is paid on a unitary basis for business transacted
or work done partly in and partly outside the city the taxable
amount is the portion of the total compensation that the "in-city"
business done or days worked bears to the total.94 It is not consid-
7 Thus, in Milwaukee County v. White Co., 296 U. S. 268 (1935), the
plaintiff was simply treated as though it were the state.
A state income tax on non-residents must be non-discriminatory and
cannot deprive them of exemptions equivalent to those allowed residents
though it may limit the deductions of non-residents to those occurring within
the state. Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U. S. 60 (1920); Shaffer v.
Carter, 252 U. S. 37 (1920).88 See note 71 supra.
89 3fl U. S. 435 (1940).
90 Wis. Laws 1935, c. 505, § 3 as amended by Wis. Laws 1935, c. 552.
91 311 U. S. 435 at 444, 445.
92311 U. S. 435, 446 (dissenting opinion).
93 Philadelphia Ord. § 2 as amended.
9 4 Philadelphia Income Tax. Regs. Art. 11-2. (In these footnotes the local
income tax regulations will be identified hereafter by reference to the name
of the local unit.)
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ered practicable to insist on strict application of the pro rata rule
in all cases. For example, where the non-resident simply comes to
town to report and get instructions or is employed on a train which
regularly passes through the city and his services performed with-
in the city are incidental to those performed without the city, he is
not treated as engaged in a taxable activity within the city.95
The taxability of earnings of a non-resident of Philadelphia
was first clearly determined in Kiker v. Philadelphia.9" Plaintiff, a
resident of New Jersey who worked in the Philadelphia Navy Yard
and commuted by boat on the Delaware without going through
Philadelphia proper, asked that enforcement of the ordinance against
him be restrained. The Navy Yard is on League Island, which
is within the city limits. Among other things Kiker contended that
he received no protection or benefit from the city. In upholding the
tax as applied to non-residents, the court stated that the recession
by Congress to the state of power to tax in the Navy Yard area9 7
carried with it the obligation to make available the usual services
provided by the municipality to residents and citizens. This poten-
tial benefit was considered enough to support taxing jurisdiction
even though the city did not actually provide governmental ser-
vices on the island. The court judicially noticed, moreover, that the
city cut ice in the Delaware and thus enabled plaintiff to go to
work by boat in the winter!
Prior to the 1949 Amendments to Pennsylvania Act 481, school
districts taxed the income of non-residents which was earned with-
in their boundaries and no judicial difficulty was encountered. It
was clearly implied in the then credit provisions of the statute"
that school districts could tax the income of non-residents earned
within their boundaries. A school district is an ad hoc unit per-
forming a single function. Does benefit exist if the taxpayer is a
non-resident and his children go to school elsewhere? Obviously
general benefits are enough; a resident might be a confirmed
bachelor. Is it not true, moreover, that one derives general benefits
from the promotion of literacy, if not erudition, in the community
where he works?
9 5 Id. at Art. 1I-2 (a).
96 346 Pa. 624, 31 A. 2d 289 cert. denied, 320 U. S. 741 (1943). In Guerra v.
Philadelphia, 30 F. Supp. 791 (ED. Pa. 1940) a resident of New Jersey who
was employed in Philadelphia raised the question of applicability of the tax
to non-residents by asking an injunction against the enforcement of the tax.
The court refused to examine the question saying that the jurisdictional amount
was not present and that the existence of a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy
in the Pennsylvania courts also prevented it from taking jurisdiction.
97 54 STAT. 1059 (1940) as reenacted by 61 STAT. 641 (1947), 4 U.S.C. 106
(1949).
98 Act 481 of 1947 § 5.
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Where the non-residents reside in another state there may well
be special problems of enforcement in cases where the tax cannot
be collected at the source. For example, where the impact of the tax
is on business profits the taxing local unit may have occasion to sue
for the tax in the state of residence. The judicial disposition against
enforcing foreign revenue laws renders it advisable to obtain
judgment in the mother state of the taxing unit, if jurisdiction of
the taxpayer can be had and, then, rely on the full faith and credit
clause in suing on the judgment in the state of residence. 99
The Toledo ordinance took the lead in spelling out a formula
for allocating earned net profits of non-residents. 10 0 This is the for-
mula: First compute the percentage of (1) the value of the tax-
payer's corporeal property in Toledo to that of all his corporeal
property, (2) the taxpayer's gross receipts from sales made and
work done in Toledo to his total and (3) of his non-executive pay-
roll for employees in the city to the total. Then, determine the av-
erage of these percentages. The result is the percentage figure to
use in allocating net income to Toledo. The formula is permissive;
the Board of Review established by the ordinance may substitute
other factors where the formula would not produce a just and
equitable result. Several other cities have borrowed this device, 10 1
but Columbus, St. Louis and Youngstown use it only where the
records of the taxpayer do not show what net income is reasonably
attributable to business or other activity in the city.10 2
EARNED INcoiw. (a) Regular employment-wages and salaries.
Many laymen and some lawyers on first encountering a local in-
come tax will almost automatically think of it in terms of the pro-
gressive and graduated Federal Income Tax with which they are
already familiar. The local income taxes which have been levied
in this country in the wake of the Philadelphia experiment bear
little similarity to the Federal Tax except that they may also be
classified as income taxes. Local income taxation, in fact, follows
a markedly uniform pattern of flat rates without substantial ex-
emptions or, in the case of salaries and wages, even of deductions.
The local income taxes have uniformly imposed the tax rate
on the gross income from wages and salaries on the net income
9 9 In Milwaukee County v. White Co., 296 U. S. 268 (1935), the Court
stressed the difference between an original action and a cause of action based
on a judgment.
100 Toledo Ord. § 3.
101 See, e.g., the following ordinances which use substantially similar
formulas: Dayton Ord. § 2; Louisville Ord. § 2 (only two factors are used in
the Louisville formula); Warren Ord. § 2.102 Columbus Ord. § 2; St Louis Ord. § 3; Youngstown Ord. § 2.
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from business activities.10 3" This distinction between, the taxation
of employees and- the taxation of business profits has been upheld
as reasonable classification, usually on the basis that business
profits are uncertain. 10 4 It would seem that the classification could
be more persuasively supported on the ground that, in a rough
sense, gross wages and salaries are net income, whereas the gross
income of a business or profession is likely to be substantially off-
set by expenses incurred in producing it. The Philadelphia Income
Tax regulations make detailed provision for the taxation of those
who receive wages, salaries, commissions and other income arising
out of an employment relation. Bonuses and incentive payments
are treated as taxable income.10 5
The Philadelphia Regulations formerly classified marriage
fees and other monies received by clerics for religious services as
income from a profession.1 6 This was successfully attacked by a
Roman Catholic priest. Under the canons of his church he could
not exact a charge for such services but was free to receive offer-
ings. The Superior Court, two judges dissenting, ruled that the
offerings were gratuities and not "earned income" within the
meaning of the ordinance. 10 7 The dissenting opinion'08 was, we
believe, on sounder ground; the dissenters said the nub of the mat-
ter was whether the transfer was made for services rendered. The
tip has become a characteristic American institution. Quite com-
monly the person who receives the pourboire is not in a position
to exact it, but that it is compensation for service is hardly debat-
able. 109
Disability and accident benefits are treated as income only
where the employee has an enforceable right to receive the bene-
fits.110 Because of the unusual method of contracting for the ser-
vices of professional musicians special provision has been made
which requires the purchaser of the music to withhold the taxes of
103 See, e.g., Philadelphia Ord. § 2. The amendments to § 2 of the ordinance
have retained the basic classification.
104 See, e.g., Louisville v. Sebree, 308 Ky. 420, 214 S.W. 2d 248 (1948);
Dole v. Philadelphia, 337 Pa. 375, 11 A. 2d 163 (1940).
105 Philadelphia Regs., Art. H-1 (a) & (b).
10 6 Philadelphia Income Tax Reg. promulgated Nov. 2, 1940.
107 Ross v. Philadelphia, 149 Pa. Super. 33, 25 A. 2d 834 (1942).
108 Id. at 41,25 A. 2d at 835 (dissenting opinion).
109 Some municipalities have specifically included tips as earned income.
See, e.g., Philadelphia Regs. Art. II-1 (e); Columbus Regs. Art. I-1 A (e);
Dayton Regs. Art. 11-4-2 (e); Louisville License Fee Regs. Art. 11-1, §1, e, 1
(a); Springfield egs. §II-1 F (1); Toledo Regs. Art. II-1 (e); Warren Regs.
Art. H-1 (e); Youngstown egs. Art. 11-1 (e). And some have refused to
follow the logic of the Pennsylvania court and continue to include marriage and
similar fees as earned income. See, e.g., Warren Regs. Art. II-1 (d).
110 Philadelphia egs. Art. 11-1 (e) (2).
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the musicians except in the case of "name bands," where the leader
or owner is made responsible for withholding.' Full time life in-
surance agents are taxed on all commissions received from policies
placed with the company with which the agent has a full time
employment status." 2 Part time insurance agents and general in-
surance agents, who are residents, are taxed on all commissions
received." 3 Their non-resident fellows are taxed on commissions
received on policies sold fro residents and on those sold to non-resi-
dents if they, the agents, conduct their business in Philadelphia
offices and do not maintain outside offices for sales of policies to
non-residents and the keeping of records on them." 4
(b) Self-employment. We have already seen that employees
and the self-employed are separately classified for local income
tax purposes and that the latter are taxed on net profits of "busi-
nesses, professions or other activities."" 5 In this second category
one might expect to find, along with business and professional
people generally, independent contractors," 6 professional fidu-
ciaries" 7 and persons who buy and sell real property or securities
as a business or are in the business of owning and operating or
simply managing such properties." 8 The line between administer-
ing or managing one's own investments as good husbandry in per-
sonal affairs and being in the business of property ownership and
management is not sharply defined. The Philadelphia regulations
treat operation of loft buildings, apartment hotels, hotel buildings,
office buildings and similar structures, as well as apartment houses
over three stories in height, unequivocally as taxable activities. In
the case of lesser dwelling structures the regulations permit con-
sideration, in determining "business activity vel non," of the num-
ber of properties operated, the employment of labor in the opera-
tion and the ratio of income of the properties to all other income of
the owner or person for whom the properties are operated." 9 The
regulations declare the buying and selling of securities a taxable
activity where the transactions "are not isolated and few, but are
extended so as to constitute an activity.' 120
In two cases decided in January, 1950, the Supreme Court of
'lId. at Art. I-I (f).
112 1d at Art. ]1-1 (g), § ]I.
13Id. at Art I-1 (g), § HI.
114 1d. at Art. H-1 (g), §§ H and HI.
1"5 Philadelphia Ord. § 2 as amended.
"6 Philadelphia Regs. Art. 11-3 (d) 3.
117Id- at Art. 31-3 (d) 2.118 It is evident that the business of buying and selling realty is a taxable
business activity within the meaning of Philadelphia Regs. Art. 11-3.
19 Philadelphia Regs. Art. IU-3 (b) 3.
120 1d. at Art. 11-3 (d) 1.
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Pennsylvania determined that the investment operations of a law-
yer12 1 and a retired businessman' 2 2 were not taxable activities un-
der the Philadelphia ordinance. The lawyer employed real estate
agents to conduct his real estate transactions for him. This in-
'cluded original purchase and sale, repairs, insurance and rentals.
His real estate holdings were very substantial. No structure ex-
ceeded three stories. He provided electricity to certain properties
and janitor service to another and that was all. The retired busi-
nessman owned two buildings, each of three stories. He furnished
no services; all he did was collect rents, pay taxes and maintain in-
surance. Both dealt some in securities through brokers but the
layman was far more active - he averaged ten purchases and
eleven sales a year but these included, as separate items, sales
executed at different times pursuant to a single order and purchases
and sales in connection with the receipt and disposal of stock rights,
stock dividends and securities redeemed. The conclusion in both
cases was that the tax did not apply because only unearned income
on investments was involved. This was achieved without invalidat-
ing the somewhat flexible regulation as to real estate. 123 Nor did
the court expressly impeach the securities transactions regulation
although it declared the regulation's use of "activity" inconsistent
with the ordinance.1 24
Some years before the Pennsylvania Court had upheld the
application of the tax to the net profits of a corporate trustee en-
gaged in operating real estate as a mortgagee in possession or as
owner protecting trust assets pending litigation. 125 It appeared
from the trustee's own illustrations of its operations that it fur-
nished services consisting of labor, light, heat, power or supervision.
As recently as February, 1950, the Pennsylvania court has
invalidated, so far as pertinent here, a December, 1949, amend-
ment to the Philadelphia ordinance which was clearly broad enough
to reach simple investment income.12 6 We have already ventured
to criticize that tribunal's view that a tax on income is a tax on
the source.1 27 Obviously, if a tax on the income of realty is a
121 Breitinger v. Philadelphia, 363 Pa. 512, 70 A. 2d 640 (1950).
122 Murray v. Philadelphia, 363 Pa. 524, 70 A. 2d 647 (1950).
123 Id. at 530, 70 A. 2d at 650. The realty regulations are Philadelphia Pegs.
Art. 11-3 (b).
124 Murray v. Philadelphia, 363 Pa. 524, 531, 70 A. 2d 647, 650 (1950). The
securities transaction regulation is Philadelphia Regs. Art. 11-3 (d) 1.
125 Pennsylvania Co. v. Philadelphia, 346 Pa. 406, 31 A. 2d 137 (1943).
126 Murray v. Philadelphia, 71 A. 2d 280 (Pa. 1950) invalidated Philadelphia
Ordinance approved Dec. 9, 1949, except for the provision increasing the rate
of the tax.
127 See note 80 supra.
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property tax uniformity is denied.12 8 The question here is this -
since income from the business of operating properties is attribut-
able in very substantial part to the capital investment will the fac-
tor of business activity continue to control and, thus, leave the way
clear for local income taxation? Certainly, the corporate trustee
case has not been overruled. The patent moral of the cases -to the
investor is that he should minimize his services in relation to rental
property, for example, if he would avoid the city income tax.
There has been no reported judicial experience with these
problems outside of Pennsylvania. The Ohio municipalities -utiliz-
ing income taxes have followed the basic Philadelphia pattern where-
by the tax is imposed on the gross income of wage earners and on the
net profits of the self-employed. They, too, impose the tax on earned
income. Their ordinances, that of Dayton excepted, 12 9 define the
earned net profits on which the tax is imposed on the self employed
in such a way that the net profits must be earned in the course of a
regular profession, business or other enterprise. 130 The various
municipal income tax regulations in Ohio are generally limited to
earned income.131 However, a number of these municipalities in-
clude rental income as taxable.1 32 The implication is that rental in-
come is taxable because earned, and yet, except for Toledo' 3 3 and
Youngstown 134 there is no attempt to relate rental income to services
rendered or supervision performed in connection with the rental
property. In short, only a minority of these municipalities have
not faced up to the problems encountered recently by Philadel-
phia. 385
1 2 8 It is evident that there would be inequality of treatment as between
income producing property and non-productive property.
129 Dayton Ordinance § 1 defined "net profits" in part as follows: "[tlhe
gross income derived from any transaction, venture or activity ... whethei
permanent, temporary or non-recurring in character to the extent that it can
be made by the City of Dayton... " (writers' emphasis).
1 30 Columbus Ordinance § 1; Springfield Ordinance § 1; Toledo Ordinance
§ 2; Warren Ordinance § 1; Youngstown Ordinance § 1.
131 Columbus Regs. Art. 11-3, 4 & 5; Springfield Regs. § 11-3, 4 & 5; Toledo
Begs. Art. 11-3, 4 & 5; Warren Regs. Art. U-3, 4 & 5; Youngstown Regs. Art.
11-3, 4 & 5.
132 Columbus Begs. Arts. 11-7-3-3, 11-10 (m); Dayton Arts. I-1 (g), 11-9
(h); Springfield Begs. § 11-3 E; Toledo Begs. Arts. 1-6-3-3, 11-9 (j); Warren
Begs. Arts. 11-6-3-3,11-9 (n); Youngstown Regs. Arts. 11-6-3-3, 11-9 (n).
1
33 Toledo Begs. Art. 11-9 (j).
134 Youngstown Regs. Art. 11-9 (n).
135 The City Attorney of Columbus has concluded that a trustee of realty
who only has authority to receive rents and distribute them to beneficiaries,
and who does not control or manage is not taxable on trust income from the
realty. Opinion of the City Attorney of Columbus to the City Auditor dated
May 24, 1949. The conclusion of the city attorney does not appear to be re-
flected in the Columbus Income Tax Regulations.
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(c) Casual and irregular employment. The local income tax
ordinances do not refer specifically to intermittent employment. The
terms in which the taxes are imposed, however, are usually suffi-
ciently broad to include employment of this character. 3 There can
be no doubt but that employment of brief duration is taxable. Even
isolated instances of employment for only a few hours at a time are
subject to the tax.137 As a practical matter, however, strict enforce-
ment at this level may not be worth the candle. 138
INVESTMENT INCOME
There is, of course, nothing in the nature of things to preclude
local taxation of investment income. In Pennsylvania, however,
the uniformity clause' 39 and statutory preemption have, between
them, pretty well excluded local units from this part of the field. As
we have seen, taxability of the income of various types of investments
were recently considered in the second Murray case 140 and the city
lost at every turn. Thus, Pennsylvania local units can get at the
income from property only where the taxpayer can be said to be
engaged in the business of operating properties which would place
the income in the earned category.
We venture to prophesy that the Ohio Court would not treat
a tax on investment income as a tax on the source.141 In Ohio, more-
over, the uniformity requirement applies only to land and improve-
ments thereon.142 On the other hand, intangibles are not taxed
locally but are subject to a state tax the proceeds of which are
shared locally.143 The tax on productive "local situs" intangibles
is measured by their income yield.144 Thus, so long as the Ohio pre-
136 See, e.g., Philadelphia Ord. approved Dec. 13, 1939, § 2 and amendments
thereto; St. Louis Ord. § 2; Youngstown Ord. § 2. The catch-all phrase em-
ployed in most of the ordinances is, "and other compensation earned."
137 See, e.g., Income Tax Regulations for City of Sharon, Sharon School
District, Farrell School District, Borough of Sharpsville, Sharpsville School
District, Wheatland School District, and Hickory Township School District
Art. I-1. (These local units are all located in Pennsylvania. Their income tax
regulations will hereafter be cited as "Sharon Uniform Regs.")
138 Some municipalities have possibly been influenced by enforcement
considerations in specifically exempting the earnings of minors under specified
ages. Columbus Ord. § 16-6; Dayton Ord. § 16-5; Springfield Ord. § 15 (f).
139 Kelley v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. 180, 181 Atl. 598 (1935).
140 Murray v. Philadelphia, 363 Pa. 524, 70 A. 2d 647 (1950).
141 See State ex rel. Zielonka v. Carrel, 99 Ohio St. 220, 224, 124 N.E. 134,
135 (1919).
142 OM CoNsT. ART. XII § 2. State ex rel. Struble v. Davis, 132 Ohio St.
555, 9 N.E. 2d 684 (1937).
143 Public libraries, municipalities and counties are the primary benefi-
ciaries. Omo GEN. CODE § 5639 (Supp. 1949).144 See note 58 supra.
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emption doctrine survives, there is a question whether the state has
preempted the field as to these intangibles. Pointed reference was
made to this in the separate opinion of Judge Taft in the recent
Toledo case.14 5
Aside from the possible problems raised by the impact of the
preemption doctrine, there is nothing to prevent Ohio municipali-
ties from taxing investment income in the exercise of their home
rule powers.
CAPrrAL GAms
In Philadelphia the situation as to capital gains and losses was,
down to December, 1949, the same as that with respect to income
from property; they were to be taken into account only if classifi-
cable as business or earned income or losses.14 6 This appears to be
the case now under the Louisville ordinance and some of the Ohio
ordinances.14 7 The Columbus, Youngstown and Warren regula-
tions, on the other hand, declare that capital gains and losses shall
not be taken into account in arriving at "net profits earned."' 4 8
The December 9, 1949, amendatory ordinance of Philadelphia was
clearly broad enough to cover any class of unearned income.1' 9 Its
validity in this respect was not specifically in issue in the second
Murray case, but the court declared all the provisions of the ordi-
nance other than that raising the rate on earned income, too vague
to be enforceable. 150 It is not evident that the uniformity require-
ment stands in the way. In federal income tax lore there is noth-
ing more commonplace than that a capital gain levy is not imposed
on the property with respect to which gain is realized. Thus, in-
tergovernmental immunity does not preclude taxation of capital
gains on public securities. 15 '
The home rule taxing power of Ohio municipalities would, we
believe, extend to income taxation of capital gains, whether class-
ifiable as earned or unearned income. There is no similar state levy
which can be said to preempt the field.
145 See note 73 supra- See Springfield Regs. §§ I-1 F & 11-7 C (3) which ex-
clude from the municipal income tax the income from property subject to the
Ohio Intangible Personal Property Tax.
146 Philadelphia Pegs. Art. 11-7 (j).
147 Louisville Begs. Art. HI-5 (j); Dayton Regs. Art. 11-9 (e); Springfield
Regs. § 11-8 C; Toledo Regs. Art. U-9 (j).
14 8 Columbus Begs. Art. 11-10 (j); Warren Income Tax Begs. Art. 11-9 (j);
Youngstown Income Tax Regs. Art 11-9 (j).
149 Philadelphia Ord. approved Dec. 9, 1949 § 3 which provides for the
imposition of the tax, inter alia, "on all other net income derived . .. from
150 Murray v. Philadelphia, 71 A. 2d 280, 289 (Pa. 1950).
any source whatsoever... "
:5 1 Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U.S. 216 (1931).
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PARTNERSIMS
It is obvious that local income levies would reach income from
partnership activities. The method, however, varies. In Philadel-
phia the primary rule is to exact the tax from the partnership as
an entity.152 To the extent, however, that partnership income is
non-Philadelphia it can be reached only as to resident members and
that is done on the basis of their distributive shares.153 The Colum-
bus and St. Louis patterns are similar. 154 Neither city requires
partnership information returns. The late Dayton ordinance ex-
pressly rejected taxation as an entity 155 and the regulations, ac-
cordingly, exacted information returns.156
ComoRAToNs
Philadelphia first undertook to apply its income tax to corpor-
ations as such by its amendatory ordinance of December 9, 1949.
The effort went aground on the shoals of preemption. The state
franchise tax and corporate income tax barred the way as to for-
eign corporations. 157 The capital stock and corporate income taxes
did as much with respect to domestic corporations. 158 Pittsburgh
and other units operating under Act No. 481 have found a way to
obviate the preemption difficulty with respect to what is at least a
substantial class of corporations. Pittsburgh has an excise, a mer-
cantile license tax, measured in terms of gross income, which has
been sustained in its application to domestic and foreign corpora-
tions.' 59
The Ohio income tax cities and Louisville and St. Louis, as
well, do tap corporate income.'6 0 No effort is made to base the tax
on total corporate net profits without regard to source, even in the
case of domestic corporations. Instead, the design is to apply the tax
simply to income attributable to business conducted in the taxing
unit. Thus, all business corporations, domestic and foreign, are
placed on the same footing. For this purpose an allocation formula,
15 2 Philadelphia Regs. Art. 11-4.
153 Id. at 11-3 (a).
154 Columbus Regs. Arts. 11-3, 11-4; St. Louis Regs. §§ 10 & 31.
155 Dayton Ord. (1949) § 2 (1).
156 Dayton Regs. Art. IV-1-3. Sharon Uniform Regs. Art. H-A 1 also re-
quires an informational return.
157 Murray v. Philadelphia, 71 A. 2d 280, 288 (Pa. 1950).
15sId. at 284, 285.
159 Federal Drug Co. v. Pittsburgh, 358 Pa. 454, 57 A. 2d 849 (1948).
160 Columbus Ord. § 2 (5); Dayton Ord. § 2 (3); Louisville Ord. § 1;
Springfield Ord. § 2 (5); St. Louis Ord. § 2 (e); Toledo Ord. § 3 (5); Warren
Ord. § 2 (5); Youngstown Ord. § 2 (5).
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like that employed by Toledo in the case of a non-resident indi-
vidual,161 is used. Under the Columbus ordinance and regulations
if the business in Columbus of a corporation is so departmentalized
that actual records of it will disclose the net profit derived wholly
from business done within the city and such records are actually
kept under a usual accounting system, which is acceptable for
federal income tax purposes, those actual records must be used. 16 2
Otherwise, resort is to be had to the allocation formula. St. Louis
has a similar pattern.0 3
The Columbus and Toledo regulations, influenced, doubtless,
by the Youngstown case,'0 4 authorize the exclusion of gross re-
ceipts of public utility corporations, upon which the state excise
tax is paid, in determining net profits for purposes of the tax. 16 5
The ordinances do not speak to the point; the exclusion is apparent-
ly achieved by very liberal interpretation.
COOPERATIVES
Many cooperatives engage in what are functionally business
activities within the meaning of local income tax ordinances. That
seems clear enough. Whether they realize "net profits" is the vital
question. Apparently most of the local units levying income taxes
have taken the label "non-profit corporation" at face value. Sev-
eral Ohio cities have, however, proceeded on the basis that there
may be net profits in fact.'0 6 Columbus took the lead. Her regula-
tions declare the tax applicable to income of a "non-profit organiza-
tion" determined by deducting :fom gross receipts (1) all costs
and expenses of doing business and (2) patronage refunds paid in
cash within ninety days after close of the taxpayer's accounting
period with respect to which they were made.', 7
ESTATES AxD TRUSTS
To the extent that an estate or trust earns net profits in like
fashion as a business corporation, there appears to be no reason
why it should not be taxed on such income. The Philadelphia reg-
16 1 See note 100 supra.
162 Columbus Ord. § 2 (6); Columbus Regs. Art. 11-5-3 (a).
163 St. Louis Regs. § 12 C (1) & (2).
164 See note 55 supra.
165 Columbus :Regs. Art. 11-5-4; Toledo Regs. Art. H-5-4. Columbus and
Toledo both prescribe that no deduction shall be allowed for expenses in-
curred in producing the gross receipts so excluded.
166 Columbus Regs. Art. 11-6; Dayton Regs. Art. 11-6; Springfield Regs.
Art. 11-6.
107 Columbus Regs. Art. 1-6-1.
1950]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
ulations proceed on just this basis as to a trust estate.168 And the
supreme court has upheld the application of the tax to estate in-
come produced by a corporate trustee engaged in operating real
estate, sometimes as mortgagee in possession and sometimes as
owner, for the purpose of protecting the assets of the estate pend-
ing liquidation and sale.169 Trust or estate income which is prop-
erly to be classified simply as investment income could be reached
in Pennsylvania only in the unlikely possibility that neither the
uniformity clause nor state preemption stood in the way.170
The definition of "business" in the Toledo regulations excludes
"the ordinary administration of a decedent's estate by the executor
or administrator, and the mere custody, supervision and manage-
ment of trust property under a passive trust, whether inter vivos
or testamentary, unaccompanied by the actual operation of a 'busi-
ness' as herein defined."' 7 1
Columbus, 7 2 Springfield, 73 and Warren, Ohio, 174 all have sub-
stantially similar provisions. Dayton achieved the same result as
to the income of decedents' estates during the period of adminis-
tration by exempting such income, not earned in the operation of a
business, from the tax.' 75 It, thus, appears that these cities are not
trying to reach unearned investment income of estates and trusts,
whether distributed or undistributed. The same is true of the Louis-
ville impost, which, as we have seen, is formalized as a license tax
measured by earned income.'1 "
EXEMTrIoxs AD DEDUCTIONS
Most local income taxes allow no personal exemptions nor de-
ductions for dependents at all. Two exceptions have been observed.
The Springfield, Ohio, levy does not apply to earnings of $1040 or
less per annum1 of any taxpayer, individual or corporate. If, how-
ever, a taxpayer's total "taxable" income exceeds $1040 he is taxed
upon all of it. This largely nullifies the exemption. Warren, Ohio,
'
6 8 Philadelphia Regs. Art. 11-3 (c).
169 Pennsylvania Co. v. Philadelphia, 346 Pa. 406, 31 A. 2d 137 (1943).
170 Sharon Uniform Regs. Art 11-C 3 is an attempt to tax trust income.
17' Toledo Regs. Art. I-I (b).
172 Columbus Regs. Art. I-I (b).
173 Springfield Regs. § 1-2.
174 Warren Regs. Art. I-1 (b).
175 Dayton Regs. Art. XVI-1-7.
176Louisville Regs. Art. 11-2, § 2 (b) provides that, "[wi henever a trust
estate is engaged in an enterprise, activity or business which is productive of
income, said income shall be considered subject to the license fee."
177 Springfield Ord. § 15 (g).
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has an outright exemption of $1200 per annum. 178 This is as close as
any of the local income taxes come to relating burden to ability to
pay.
A few cities have excluded personal earnings of minors below
certain ages outright.'7 9 Columbus and Springfield exclude funds
received from local, state or Federal Government because of ser-
vice in the armed forces of the United States.' 80 In the case of the
minor an adequate personal exemption would be a better approach.
Why exempt all the earnings of a minor who has a demonstrated
adult earning capacity? Nor is it apparent that the tax should not
reach military service earnings - at least during a non-hot-war
period.
Various types of receipts, some of which could hardly be con-
sidered earned income in any event, have been expressly excluded.
Within this category are (1) poor relief benefits, (2) public or char-
itable pensions or assistance to the aged or disabled, (3) pensions,
disability benefits annuities or gratuities from any source, (4) copy-
right and patent royalties and (5) compensation for personal
injury.181
Salaries, wages and commissions of employed persons are taxed
without deductions for expenses incurred in producing the income or
any other items. This is, of course, a rather crude pattern. Whatever
justification can be mustered for it would probably amount to this -
salaries and wages are largely net to begin with and to allow deduc-
tions would create an unwarranted administrative burden.
In determining professional and business net profits, allowable
deductions under the Columbus tax, for example, include (1) all
ordinary and necessary business (or professional) expenses, (2) de-
preciation, depletion, obsolescence and losses from theft or casualty,
not otherwise claimed, (3) bad debts for the year ascertained worth-
less and charged off or a reasonable addition to a reserve for the pur-
pose and (4) taxes directly connected with the business (or pro-
fession) .182 Capital gains are, as a general rule not included on the
income side, nor may capital losses be deducted, 183 Income from the
sale, as a dealer, of securities or real property is, however, taxable
178 Warren Ord. § 2.
179 Columbus Ord. § 16-6 (under 18 years of age); Dayton Ord. § 16-5
(under 16 years of age); Springfield Ord. § 15 (f) (under 16 years of age).
180 Columbus Ord. § 16-1; Springfield Ord. § 15 (a).
181 Exclusions of the type listed in the text may be found in the following
regulations: Columbus Regs. Arts. 11-1 & 11-10; Dayton Regs. Art. XVI-1;
Louisville Regs. Art. 11-1, § 1 (e) 2; Springfield Regs. § XV; Toledo Regs. Arts.
H1-1; Warren Begs. Arts. II-1 & 11-9.
182 Columbus RegS. Ar ]1-10 (f), (g), (h) and (i).
18s Id. at Art. 1-10 0i). But see Philadelphia Begs. Art. 11-7 (j).
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business income.'8 4 Presumably all costs of such activity can be set
off against all receipts but it is not clear that a net loss could be
deducted from earned income received in another activity or in an
employee capacity.
INTERGOvERNMENTAL RELATiONS
There is, of course, no longer any constitutional difficulty about
subjecting the salaries and wages of federal officers and employees
to state and local income taxation. 8 5 It is of interest that in one of the
Philadelphia cases it was argued that the Sterling Act did not en-
able the city to tax the salaries of federal personnel since at the time
the Act was adopted the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity
was still deemed by the Supreme Court of the United States to ap-
ply to such income.'8 6 The superior court proved a poor market for
such an idea; that court relied upon the prospective character and
operation of the Sterling Act. 8 7 The Act was designed to enable the
city to impose substantially any kind of a tax which the state did
not and it was implicit that a subject which subsequently became
amenable to city income taxation would automatically fall within
the sweep of the power conferred. 8 8
There is, apart from the erstwhile immunity of federal salaries,
a separate question as to state and local taxing jurisdiction over fed-
eral areas. In 1940 Congress enacted legislation expressly consent-
ing to state and local taxation of income received by federal em-
ployees residing or working in federal areas.189
It is clear that the federal act carries far enough to permit of
municipal taxation of income earned in a federal area by one resid-
184 Philadelphia Regs. Art. 11-3 (d) (1) classifies the business of buying
and selling securities as taxable. It is apparent that one engaged in the
business of selling either securities or realty is engaged in a taxable activity
within the meaning of an income tax based on earned income without regard
to whether the particular businesses are expressly stated to be taxable.
185 Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939) (state taxation
of federal employee).
186 Philadelphia v. Schaller, 148 Pa. Super. 276, 25 A. 2d 406, cert. denied,
317 U.S. 649 (1942).
187 Id. at 281, 25 A. 2d at 410.
188 The net income of a contractor from work performed under a federal
contract is subject to state and local income taxation. James v. Dravo Con-
tracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937). It has been held recently that federal em-
ployees are subject to the provisions of the Louisville License Fee Ordinance.
Cook v. Commissioners of the Sinking Fund of Louisville, 312 Ky. 1, 226 S.W.
2d 328 (1950). (The quotation at 226 S.W. 2d 329, 330, from the concurring
opinion of Frankfurter, J., in the O'Keefe case was inadvertently ascribed to
Chief Justice Hughes.)
189 54 STAT. 1059, 1060 (1940) as reenacted by 61 STAT. 641, 644-645 (1947),
4 U.S.C. 106 (1949).
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ing in the municipality outside the area as well as income earned by
a resident of the area outside of it but in the city.190 It is clear,
moreover, that a state may reserve for itself and its local units tax-
ing jurisdiction over territory ceded to the Federal Government. 19 1
Where jurisdiction is so reserved the authority to tax does not de-
pend upon the federal statute.
The question has arisen in Pennsylvania whether Philadelphia
could impose an income tax upon a non-resident working in a fed-
eral area situated within the geographical limits of the city exclus-
ive jurisdiction of which had been ceded by the state to the Federal
Government. 192 The question arose in relation to a person employed
at the League Island Navy Yard. The state had ceded exclusive
jurisdiction of the island to the Federal Government reserving only
the authority to execute civil and criminal process in the area. The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided that the federal statute
consenting to state taxation of persons living or receiving income
in a federal area constituted, in substance, a recession of taxing jur-
isdiction to Pennsylvania and that the effect of the recession was to
impose upon Philadelphia the obligation to provide all the usual
governmental services and protections to those receiving income
from working on League Island. The court did not think it made
any difference that the Federal Government was not looking to
Philadelphia to provide those governmental services for persons
working on the island. The Supreme Court of the United States den-
ied certiorari. 193
As for collecting a local income tax upon earnings at the source
the local units have no hope of being able to require the Federal
Government to withhold the tax in the case of federal employees.
This device cannot be used without the consent of Congress. 194
Intergovernmental immunity as between a state and its local
units is, of course, a matter of state policy. Even where local units
have a measure of constitutional home rule the state-local relation-
ship is not closely comparable to the federal system. The local units
are creatures of the state and the state can take steps to adjust any
unbalance.
A state employee who resided in Philadelphia sought to enjoin
19 0 But see Kiker v. Philadelphia, 346 Pa. 624, 640, 31 A. 2d 289, 298 (1943)
(dissenting opinion).19 1 James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134 (1937).
192 Kiker v. Philadelphia, 346 Pa. 624, 31 A. 2d 289, cert denied., 320 U. S.
741 (1943).
193 ibid.
194 The Comptroller General has ruled that withholding of the salaries
of federal employees could not be required under an Oregon income tax law.
Comp. Gen. Dec. B - 72432, Jam 6, 1948.
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the collection of the city's income tax from her.'9 5 The grant of
power to tax made by the Sterling Act is couched in very broad
language and there is no exception favoring state personnel. The
city prevailed. The statute covered the case and so did the ordi-
nance since it applied to "residents of Philadelphia."'9 0 Intergovern-
mental immunity was rejected on substantially the same reasoning
as we have employed in the preceding paragraph.
Collection from state personnel may not be effected by the
withholding device unless the state is willing to play ball. Pennsyl-
vania refused to withhold for Philadelphia, nor would the state
furnish the city a list of state employees. 197 The court, in the case
last cited, observed that the city could not "command" action by a
superior power,198 but that merely affected the difficulty of col-
lecting the tax and not the validity of the levy. The court would not
accept the contention that enforcement would, by reason of state
non-cooperation, be so uneven as to state personnel as to render the
levy fatally unreasonable. This does, however, pose a substantial
practical problem of tax administration and tax equity.
A good many land-going "sea-lawyers" like to think that a
state area, such as the state capitol building and grounds, is a poli-
tical island, in the city in which it is located and, thus, the earnings
of a non-resident of the city works in the area or of a person
who both works and resides in the area are not subject to the taxing
jurisdiction of the city. This, we suggest, is a mistaken notion. The
money is, technically, earned in the city. Usually, it will be found
that the municipality bears the responsibility for providing one or
more services, such as fire protection, in the area. That is responsive
to the benefit theory of jurisdiction to tax. The Pennsylvania court
considers it enough that there be potential benefits as where a city
has the governmental responsibility to provide one or more services
although another government is actually doing the job. 19 9 One work-
ing in a state area, such as a state office building, will receive sub-
stantial city benefits in the form of protected access to his place of
195 Marson v. Philadelphia, 342 Pa. 369, 21 A. 2d 228 (1941).
196 Philadelphia Ord. § 2. The provision of the ordinance of Dec. 13, 1939
in this respect, of course, has not been changed by the amendments.
197 Marson v. Philadelphia, 342 Pa. 369, 21 A. 2d 228 (1941). It has been
reported that Toledo received "very fine cooperation from the federal offices
as well as the county and the school board" in compiling lists of taxpayers.
Tillman, Actual Problems Involved in Setting Up Local Income Tax Admin-
istration in Iwcoum TAx AAnasmATio 324 (Symposium conducted by the
Tax Institute 1948). The same writer states that some firms located out-
side of Toledo have withheld the tax from employees who are residents of
Toledo at the request of those employees. Id.
198342 Pa. 369 at 375, 21 A. 2d 228, 231.
199 Kiker v. Philadelphia, 346 Pa. 624, 31 A. 2d 289, cert. denied, 320 U.S.
741 (1943).
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work and the availability of the various public and private facilities
of urban living.
What has been said concerning state personnel is equally ap-
plicable to officers and employees of local units other than the levy-
ing authority. Without the aid of statute it is not likely that a city
might compel a county, for example, to withhold the city tax on the
salaries of county personnel2 0 Here it is more a matter of one local
unit placing a' burden upon a separate governmental agency on
roughly the same level than of giving orders to a superior. But, even
so, the levying unit should be called upon to point to some authority
for requiring such assistance.
The 1949 amendment to Pennsylvania Act No. 481 authorizes
local units levying taxes under the act to make joint agreements for
their collection and to use the same person or agency to do the col-
lecting.20
1
In the area of investment income the constitutional immunity
of the income received by individuals by way of interest on United
States securities still survives.20 2 Here again Congressional consent
would be necessary to pave the way for effective state or local action.
The income from "municipals," obligations of states and of local
units of government, is quite another matter. There is no implicit
constitutional immunity, even in the case of local taxation of the in-
come from securities of the parent state. The matter depends en-
tirely upon actual exemption effected by positive law.
A not insignificant aspect of intergovernmental relations at the
local level is the problem of multiple local taxation of the same in-
come. Thus far it has not become acute in Ohio; only a scattering of
Ohio municipalities have income levies. Nor is there any state reg-
ulation of the subject. The Dayton ordinance allowed a credit to
residents for taxes paid to any other city on income subject to the
Dayton tax but only to the extent of the Dayton tax attributable to
that income.2' 3 The other Ohio cities make no allowance for tax-
ation by another city.
The Pennsylvania situation is more complex; various types of
local units, some of which may physically overlap, have the author-
ity to impose income taxes.20 4 Philadelphia, the only Sterling Act
city, has the inside track. There is nothing in that act on multiple
200 But cf. Wi'lkinsburg Borough v. School District of Wilkinsburg, 40
PA. MuN. L. R. 221 (1949) to the effect that a municipality may require school
district officials to collect and pay over a municipal amusement tax.
201 Act 481 of 1947 § 4, as amended by Act 246 of 1949, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53, § 2015.4 (Supp. 1949).202 See Fordham, LocAL GovEmuxr=T LAw 178 (1949).
203 Dayton Ord. § 17.
204 Act 481 of 1947 as amended by Act 246 of 1949, Pamphlet Laws 398,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 2015-1 et seq. (Supp. 1949).
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local taxation, but Section 5 of Act No. 481 of 1947 provides that pay-
ment of any tax to a local unit under an ordinance or resolution
passed or adopted prior to the effective date of Act No. 481 shall be
credited to and allowed as a deduction from liability for any like
tax on earned income or for any income tax imposed by any local
unit under Act No. 481. This, in effect, leaves Philadelphia with un-
disturbed precedence over Act No. 481 local units under the Phil-
adelphia income tax ordinance as amended down to the effective
date of Act No. 481.205 This applies to Philadelphia income of non-
residents and all income of residents of the city. Doubtless, a later
amendment increasing the rate of the tax would enjoy priority
but an amendatory ordinance extending its application would not.
With respect to non-overlapping Act No. 481 local units it is
first to be observed that the 1949 amendments denied to ,second,
third and fourth class school districts authority to impose taxes on
earned income of non-residents, whether taxed by the unit of re-
sidence or not.20 6 Section 5 of Act No. 481 deals with the situation
where both the unit of residence and that of the production of in-
come seek to tap earned income by giving the local unit of residence
priority; the taxpayer is allowed a credit for the amount paid the
unit of residence against his liability for a like tax of any other unit
under the act. It is significant that the credit is not, in terms, con-
fined to that part of the tax of the unit of residence attributable to
income subject to tax by the other unit. This could obviously be-
come important in a situation where the unit of residence had a
lower rate. There has been no reported judicial ruling on the ques-
tion. It has been decided that where the unit of residence levies
the maximum one per centum rate and the taxpayer's place of work
lies in two other units, which are coterminous and each of which
has a one per centum levy, he is entitled to the full credit against
the tax of each of the latter units.20 7 In a companion case the facts
were reversed; the taxpayer lived in two coterminous units and
worked in a third. He tried unsuccessfully to pay just one of the
two units of residence and credit that against the tax of ihe coter-
minous unit as well as that of the unit of employment.203
As indicated in the case last cited, a taxpayer may not credit
payments to the unit of his residence against his liability to an over-
lapping unit of residence. The same would be true under Act No.
205 It has been pointed out that the result of this situation is that no
other local income taxes have been levied in the Philadelphia area. Smedley,
LEGAL PoBL.s ImvoLViG AcT 481, 9 (Bureau of Municipal Affairs, Depart-
ment of Internal Affairs of Pennsylvania, undated).
206 Act 481 of 1947 § 1 A (5), as amended by Act 246 of 1949, PA. STAT.
AxN. tit. 53, § 2015.1 (Supp. 1949).
207 Morgan v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 165 Pa. Super. 203, 67 A. 2d 756 (1949).
208 Glen Alden Coal Co. v. Thomas, 165 Pa. Super. 199, 67 A. 2d 754 (1949).
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481 with respect to two overlapping units in which a non-resid-
ent's place of work was located. The 1949 amendments to Act No.
481 take a fresh tact as to overlapping units; they simply confine
each of two such units levying a tax to one-half the statutory maxi-
mum rate or to such share of the maximum as the two may deter-
mine by agreement.
2 9
ADMINISTRATION
Administrative organization for local income tax purposes has
generally been provided by placing the responsibility for adminis-
tration and enforcement upon the holder of an existing office and
leaving him to add the necessary additional staff. Philadelphia pro-
ceeded in this wise,210 although the Sterling Act authorizes the
creation of such bureaus and provision for such personnel as may
be deemed necessary.2 11 There is a similar provision in Act No. 481
of 1947 which has been made use of. 212 The City of Sharon ordinance,
for example, creates a "Sharon income tax bureau" and establishes
an office of chief clerk of the Sharon income tax bureau, who is con-
stituted at the same time receiver of the taxes levied by the ord-
inance.2 13
Most of the Ohio income tax cities have rested the administrative
responsibility upon the holders of existing offices but have, in ad-
dition, established a new administrative agency called a board of
review or a board of tax appeals. The function of these boards will
be discussed at a little later juncture in this paper.
The City of Springfield income tax ordinance established a
department of income taxation headed by the city manager and
consisting, in addition, of a board of review and a commissioner of
taxation together with such staff as might be provided.214 The com-
missioner of taxation is made the primary tax administrator. There
is a legal question in Ohio as to the manner of exercising home
rule powers with respect to the organization of municipal govern-
ment. As applied to the Springfield ordinance the question would be
whether the organization it establishes was properly set up by ord-
inance or should have been provided for by home rule charter
amendment. If one accepts the "bare bones" theory of charter-mak-
ing the Springfield ordinance is clearly valid in this respect. Judi-
269 Act 481 of 1947 § 1 E, as amended by Act 246 of 1949, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53, § 2015.1 E (Supp. 1949).
210 Philadelphia Ord. 5. 6.
211 PA. STAT. Am.T. tit. 53, § 4613 (Supp. 1949).
212Act 481 of 1947 as amended by Act 246 of 1949 § 4, PA. STAT. AwN.
tit. 53, § 2015.4 (Supp. 1949).
213 Sharon Ord. No. 1190 (1948) § 3, 4.
2 14 Springfield Ord. § 13.
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cial experience with the problem has not been such as to mark a
sharp line.210 The attorney general has indicated that the establish-
ment of a civil service commission of a city is something that must
be done by charter instead of ordinance.21 6 It is our thought that an
administrative organization set up to administer a municipal income
tax would fall on the other side of the line on the theory that it is
not so closely joined to the basic framework of municipal govern-
ment.
The Philadelphia ordinance authorizes the receiver of taxes to
"prescribe, adopt, promulgate and enforce rules and regulations
relating to any matter or thing pertaining to the administration
and enforcement of the provisions of this ordinance, including pro-
vision for the re-examination and correction of returns and pay-
ments alleged or found to be incorrect or as to which an overpay-
ment or underpayment is claimed or found to have occurred.
' 21 7
Here again the Quaker city has set the pattern; we have found
similar language in every ordinance reviewed. There are, of course,
variations. Thus, the City of Sharon, Pennsylvania, confers the
rule-making power upon the city solicitor instead of the tax ad-
ministrator.218 In Toledo the rules are subject to the approval of the
city manager and the board of review.219 In Columbus and Spring-
field they are subject to the approval of the board of review
alone.220 Springfield attempts to be a little more specific by de-
fining a regulation as something not in conflict with the provisions
of the ordinance.221 While the effect is to confer upon the rule- mak-
ing officer some power to fill in the content of the ordinance his
authority is what would conventionally be described as power to
make interpretative rules as distinguished from sub-legislation.222
What amounts to broader rule-making power as to a particular
problem has been conferred by several ordinances. The Toledo
ordinance, in order to take care of the situation where only part of
the business activity of the individual or corporation is conducted
in the city, provides a formula for the allocation of net profits and
adds that in the event a just and equitable result cannot be obtain-
ed by use of the factors set out in the ordinance the board of re-
215 See Fordham and Asher, Home Rule Powers in Theory and Practice,
9 Oro ST. L. J. 18, 27 et seq. (1948).
216 1941 Ops. ATTY. GEN. (Ohio) No. 3846.
2 1 7 Philadelphia Ord. § 6.
2 18 Sharon Ord. § 11 A.
219 Toledo Ord.§ 8, 13.
220 Columbus Ord. § 14; Springfield Ord. § 13 (b).
221 Springfield Ord.§ 1.
222 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has so described the rule-making
power under Philadelphia Ord. § 6. Murray v. Philadelphia, 71 A. 2d 280
(Pa. 1950); Pennsylvania Co. v. Philadelphia, 346 Pa. 406, 31 A. 2d 137 (1943).
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view should have authority to substitute factors calculated to effect
a fair and proper allocation. 223 The St. Louis ordinance confers
similar authority upon the collector but expressly sets as a ceiling
the amount of tax which would be arrived at by the application of
the methods of allocation spelled out in the ordinance. 22 4 The Toledo
provisions are somewhat more vulnerable since they would permit
of the substitution by an administrative board of factors of allocation
which would result in a higher tax than that to be arrived at by
use of the specific allocation provisions of the ordinance.
Returns-Taxpayer Accounting
The Philadelphia ordinance, as amended down to December,
1949, has a separate scheme of returns for three different classes
of taxpayers. A person taxed on his net profits makes an annual re-
turn on or before March 15 or within 75 days after the end of his
fiscal period if it is other than the calendar year.225 A person who
is an employee on a salary, wage, commission or other compensation
basis, who is subject to the tax but is not affected by the withholding
provisions, or being affected, whose tax is not withheld and paid to
the city by his employer, must file a return and pay quarterly.22 6
Employers in Philadelphia must withhold and pay the tax quarter-
ly with respect to employees whose compensation is subject to the
levy.227 Employees who have income subject to the tax which is
covered by employers' returns required by the ordinance do not
have to file as to that income.228 With respect to all classes of tax-
payers affected by the ordinance the forms of returns are prescribed
by the receiver of taxes.
Columbus, Ohio, has a system of returns more nearly parallel-
ing the federal plan. Columbus requires collection at the source and
quarterly return and payment.2 29 The actual taxpayers, however,
whether their income be net profits from business or professional
223 Toledo Ord. § 3 (5) b.
224 St. Louis Ord. § 3 (c).
225 Philadelphia Ord. § 3 (a), as amended March 31, 1948.
226 Philadelphia Ord. § 3 (b), as amended March 31, 1948.
227Philadelphia Ord. § 4 (a), as amended March 31, 1948. It has been
held that an employer must withhold pursuant to regulations of the Receiver
of Taxes promulgated under the ordinance. Philadelphia v. Westinghouse
Electric Co., 55 Pa. D. & C. 343 (1945).
228 Philadelphia Ord. § 3 (b), as amended March 31, 1948. Section 4 (b),
as amended March 31, 1948, which permits the receiver of taxes to accept the
returns of employers as those required of the employees when the income
from that source is the sole income subject to the tax, presumably covers
situations where the employer is not legally bound to withhold and file a
return but does so voluntarily.
229 Columbus Ord. § 5.
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activities or be compensation as employees, must file only one re-
turn a year and that on or before March 15.230 In addition, a tax-
payer who anticipates any income which is not subject to collec-
tion at the source must file a declaration of estimated tax for the
current year on or before March 15 and pay at that time at least one-
fourth of the estimated tax for the full period.23 1 The remainder of
the estimated tax must be paid quarterly on the same footing as
the federal tax.
Mandatory provision has been made for taxpayer accounting on
an accrual basis in certain circumstances. Where a taxpayer who is
taxable on net business profits keeps his books on an accrual
basis or uses such a basis for Federal Income Tax purposes he is
required to use it for returns made pursuant to the local tax.23 2
Taxpayers taxable on net business profits are not restricted to
using the calendar year accounting period. A fiscal year which ends
on the last day of some calendar month and which is acceptable for
Federal Income Tax purposes may be used by such taxpayers.233
Inventories must be used where necessary to reflect accurate-
ly net business profits. The same basis of valuation used for Federal
Income Tax purposes is generally required.234 Two methods very
commonly used are "cost" and "cost or market, whichever is low-
er." In any event consistency is more important than the method
selected. The Federal Internal Revenue Code prescribes that in-
ventories shall be used whenever they are necessary to determine
clearly the income of any taxpayer.235 There is reason to be-
lieve that local units will follow this general rule.
Collection at the source is a common feature of the local in-
come tax measures which have been examined in the preparation of
230 Id. at § 4. A taxpaper reporting on the basis of a fiscal year other
than the calandar year must file on or before the fifteenth day of the third
month after the close of his fiscal year. See note 233 infra.
231 Id. at § 6.
232 Columbus Regs. Art. 11 - 10 (b); Dayton Regs. Art. 11 - 3 -3 (b)
("the usual accounting system of the taxpaper"); Louisville Regs. Art. 11 -
5 (b); Philadelphia Regs. "Art. IH - 7 (b); Springfield Regs. § 11 - 8 A;
Toledo Regs. Art 11-9 (b); Warren Regs. Art. 1-9 (b); Youngstown Regs.
Art 1--9 (b).233 Cblumbus Regs. Art 11-9; Dayton Regs. Art. 11-1; Louisville Regs.
Art 11-4; Philadelphia Regs. Art. 11--6; St. Louis Regs. § 13; Sharon Uni-
form Regs. Art. III - B - 4 (by implication); Springfield Regs. § M - 3;
Toledo Regs. Art. H - 8; Warren Regs. Art. 1 - 8; Youngstown Regs. Art.
11-8.
234 Columbus Regs. Art H - 10 (a); Louisville Regs. Art. 11 - 5 (a);
Philadelphia Regs. Art. 11-7 (a); Springfield Regs. § 11-8 E; Toledo Regs.
Art. 11 - 9 (a); Warren Begs. Art. 11 - 9 (a); Youngstown Regs. Art 11 -
9 (a).235 IT. REv. CODE § 22 (c).
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this paper. As a matter of fact that device, copied from the federal
system, is one of the things which makes the tax attractive to local
units. It greatly facilitates administration for the levying authority
and, in most instances, actually keeps down the cost of administra-
tion by imposing the burden of collection upon the employer
without making any allowance to him for his trouble.2 36 It is sig-
nificant in this connection that the St. Louis enabling statute express-
ly gives the employer the right to keep three per centum of the
amount collected to offset the expenses of collection.23 7
There is a common provision that any tax collected by the em-
ployer by withholding at thelsourceohallbe deemeda trust fund inthe
hands of the employer for the benefit of the levying unit until it is
payed to the latter.238 Until the payment to the local unit is actually
made, the employee still has an interest since he is entitled to full
payment of his compensation either to himself or to some other party
legally entitled to take through him. So far as he is concerned there
is nothing but a simple contract obligation. It is not evident that as
between him and the employer the city can change the contract re-
lationship to a trust nexus. The employer is not required to earmark
any funds and as a matter of practice he would be expected simply to
pay the levying unit with one check for the full amount to be col-
lected from all employees subject to the tax. The withholding each
pay day is merely a bookkeeping matter. In view of these circum-
stances it would appear rather difficult to lay hand at any stage of
the game upon something which could be labeled a trust res. This
conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the ordinances carefully
provide that non-payment by the employer does not excuse the
employee. Are we to permit the levying unit to say in the same
breath that the employer without earmarking any funds holds some-
thing in trust for the unit but that until actual payment to the city
the employee remains liable?
Administrative Review
The Philadelphia ordinance makes no provision for administra-
tive review. Nor do the Louisville and St. Louis measures. The
236 See, e.g., Toledo Ord. § 6. For a commentary on the burden im-
posed on employers see Homuth, The Taxpayer Angle on Local Income Tax
Administration, in INcomE TAx ArDm s=ATiON (Symposium conducted by
the Tax Institute 1948).
237 Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7780.8 (Supp. 1949).
2 3 8 Columbus Ord. § 5; Dayton -Ord. § 5; Springfield Ord. § 5; Toledo
Ord. § 6; Warren Ord. § 5; Youngstown Ord. § 5. The withholding provi-
sions of 'the following municipalities do not employ trust terminology:
Louisville Ord. § 3; Philadelphia Ord. § 4 as amended; St. Louis Ord. § 6;
Sharon Ord. § 10.
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Ohio 'cities which have, as we have seen, been drawing upon home
rule power in levying income taxes, do provide a scheme of ad-
ministrative review. The Columbus ordinance is generally illustra-
tive, if not typical. Under it the city auditor, who is the administra-
tor of the tax, issues a proposed assessment to any taxpayer or an
employer who has failed to pay the full amount of the tax due or of
funds withheld.239 When the proposed assessment is served upon a
taxpayer or employer, he is allowed 20 days within which to make
written protest. If the protest is filed the auditor must allow him
an opportunity to be heard. After the hearing the auditor issues a
final assessment. A proposed assessment automatically becomes
final in the event the protest is not filed within the time allowed.
In either case the final assessment must be served upon the taxpayer
and he is allowed 30 days to file a written notice of appeal with the
board of appeals. In Columbus this board consists of the city at-
torney, or his designate, the city auditor, or his designate, and a rep-
resentative citizen appointed by the mayor. If a notice of appeal
is duly filed with the board, the taxpayer is allowed a hearing at the
conclusion of which the board examines, reviews or modifies the
final assessment. Presumably one who is subject to the tax would
have to exhaust this process of administrative review before seek-
ing judicial redress.
ENFORCEMENT
Where the power to levy the tax depends upon enabling legis-
lation, the same will be true of means of enforcement. In Pennsyl-
vania the Sterling Act empowers a levying unit to fix and enforce
penalties for non-payment or for violation of the provisions of a tax
ordinance..2 40 Act 481 of 1947, as amended in 1949,241 has a similar
provision, except that it authorizes "reasonable" penalties. No
mention is made of civil suits but it must be implicit that the tax-
payer may be subjected to personal liability enforceable by civil
suit. Likewise, the exaction of interest at not exceeding the legal
rate is no more than claiming damages for delay in payment, author-
ity for which may be reasonably implied. The Philadelphia ordin-
ance accordingly expressly provides for recovery of unpaid taxes,
with interest and penalties, like any other debt.242 This has set a
239 Columbus Ord. § 9.
240 PA. STAT. AN. tit. 53, § 4615 (Supp. 1949).
241 Act 481 of 1947 § 7, as amended by Act 246 of 1949, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,
§ 2015.7 (Supp. 1949). The question as to whether the Pennsylvania Local
Tax Collection Act of 1945, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5511.1 et. seq. (Supp.
1949), applies to taxes levied under Act 481 as amended is apparently an
open one. The writers express no opinion on it.
242 Philadelphia Ord. § 8.
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pattern followed by other local units levying income taxes.
The Pennsylvania statutes speak of penalties; they do not refer
to imprisonment. 243 The Philadelphia ordinance provides for a $100
fine and for imprisonment for non-payment of the fine within ten
days. This is in keeping with the historic notion that a fine imposed
by a local by-law is a civil liability to be enforced primarily by.civil
action but supported, in turn, by the sanction of imprisonmeint.24 4
The Wisconsin court has recently gone so far as to say that a statute
which authorized a local unit to define a misdemeanor or to make
imprisonment a primary punishment for a forbidden act would be
unconstitutional.24 5 The explanation was that only the state may
define a crime or provide for its punishment. This is a juristic
"throwback" which has been justly criticized.246 What difference is
there, if the purpose of the fine is punitive?
The Ohio ordinances expressly make violations misdemeanors
punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both. There is little doubt
that home rule power carries this far.247 Ohio has not been troubled
about the devolution upon municipalities of power to define mis-
demeanors and provide for their punishment.24 s The ColumbUs,
Ohio, ordinance is unique among the many Ohio and other measures
we have examined in expressly making wilfulness an element of tbe
conduct for which one may be penalize. 249 All ordinances examined
subject a person who "knowingly" makes an incomplete, false or
fraudulent return to penalty but all save that of Columbus penalize
simple failure, neglect or refusal to make a return or to pay the
tax, interest and penalties due.
Most of the ordinances reviewed make no specific refereiice
to sanctions directed to employers who are required to withold the
tax with respect to salaries and wages. They do provide penalties
for failure, neglect or refusal "of any person" to make a requirel
return, for refusal to permit official examination of his books, records
and papers or for attempts to do anything to avoid the payment of
the whole or any part of the tax. The original Philadelphia ordinance
is typical in this respect.250 It doubtless applied to an employer
2 4 3 PA. STAT. AN. tit. 53, § 4615 (Supp. 1949) (the "Sterling Act"); Act
481 of 1947 § 7 as amended by Act 246 of 1949, PA. STAT. Asou. tit. 53, § 2015.7
(Supp. 1949).
244 Dillon, MUXIciPAL Co poRATIoNs § 625 and n. 3 (5th Ed. 1911).
245 State ex rel. Keefe v. Schmiege, 251 Wis. 79, 28 N.W. 2d 345 (1947).
246 1 VAMN. L. REv. 262 (1948).
247 Fordham and Asher, Home Rule Powers in Theory and Practice, 9
OHIo ST. L. J. 18, 68 (1948).248 Omo GEx. CODE § 3628. Greenberg v. Cleveland, 98 Ohio St. 282, 120
N.E. 829 (1918).249 Columbus Ord. § 13.
250 Philadelphia Ord. § 9.
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with respect to all of the matters mentioned. When it comes to non-
payment of the tax only the taxpayer himself is subject to penalty.
The Columbus, Ohio, ordinance expressly makes it a misdemeanor
for any employer wilfully to fail, neglect or refuse to deduct, with-
hold and pay the tax. 251 It is less drastic in requiring wilfuness, but
more exacting in covering withholding and paymeno as well as the
fing- of returns, access to records and conduct designed to avoid
full disclosure.
No instance of an attempt to make a local income tax a lien upon
the property of the taxpayer has been encountered. It is arguable
that a local unit with home-rule power to levy an income tax may, by
way of implementation, make the tax a lien upon the property of
the delinquent taxpayer as well as make him subject to penal sanc-
tions. Municipalities in Ohio have home rule powers to operate public
utilities252 and it has been determined that in the exercise of this
power a municipality may impose upon a property owner a liability
to pay a tenant's water bill. 2 53 If this be true, why may not home rule
power be said to be broad enough to permit of the imposition of a
lien for utility charges or for income taxes? While it must be evident
that home rule power does not extend broadly to the enactment of
private law, it is not considered a distortion to go as far as suggested
here even though civil relations are directly affected.
Generally speaking, problems of enforcement are the same with
respect to residents and non-residents. Thus, if a non-resident is in
default on a municipal income tax imposed on income earned within
the municipality, he, as well as the resident, can be subjected to
penalty. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had no difficulty
in reaching this conclusion with respect to residents of New Jersey
working at the League Island Navy Yard, which is located within
the geographical limits of the City of Philadelphia.2 54
With respect to the civil liability of a non-resident we are faced
with the pronouncement in Dewey v. Des Moines2 55 to the effect
that a state is without legislative jurisdiction to impose personal
liability upon a non-resident owner for a special assessment. Actu-
ally, there was no provision for personal service in that case and
none was made upon the non-resident. It is not evident why per-
sonal liability may not be imposed on the basis of personal juris-
diction of the non-resident being obtained in the enforcement pro-
251 Columbus Ord. § 13.
252 OmIo CONST. Art. XVI, a 4. See Comment, 9 Omo ST. LJ. 141 (1948).
253 Pfau v. Cincinnati, 142 Ohio St. 101, 50 NE. 2d 172 (1943).
254 Kiker v. Philadelphia, 346 Pa. 624, 31 A. 2d 289, cert. denied, 320 U. S.
741 (1943).
255173 U.S. 193 (1899).
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ceeding.25 6 Certainly this must be true as to a tax upon income
earned within the taxing unit, since this involves the presence of the
taxpayer within the jurisdiction. We venture to say that it would be
so as to a levy upon income from property within the unit.
TAXPAYERS' RrEmms
The redoubtable Teufelsdrbckh was no more amenable to the
charge of prolixity than are the authors of this paper.257 Thus, it is
proposed largely to pretermit the topic of taxpayers' remedies.
Under the head of administration we have already touched upon the
efforts of Ohio cities to provide a scheme of administrative review. 25 8
Under Pennsylvania Act No. 481, as amended in 1949, a local
tax measure may not take effect for at least 30 days after adoption
and in the interim "aggrieved" taxpayers of the unit may "appeal"
to the court of quarter sessions. 259 While the court is charged by
the act not to interfere with the reasonable discretion of the local
governing body as to tax subjects or rates, it has authority to deter-
mine whether a tax is excessive or unreasonable and may even
reduce the rates of tax. An appeal may be taken to the Supreme
or Superior Court as in other cases. Since the statute sets a maxi-
mum of one per centum for taxes on earned income of individuals
it is hardly likely that a charge of excessiveness or unreasonableness
would be sustained as against a levy within the stated limit. It is
unusual to empower the judiciary to reduce tax levies; certainly
in some jurisdictions it would present a troublesome separation of
powers question.
The recent invalidation of the Dayton, Ohio, levy has bred some
nice questions with respect to previous collections. It is being con-
tended, we understand, that collection at the source should be con-
sidered involuntary payment not governed by the general statutory
provision for filing written protest to ground recovery on the ground
of illegality.2 60
256 See Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 393 (1934) which allowed resort
to property other than that taxed to enforce collection of a non-resident's
ad valorem taxes. See also Rubin, Collection of Delinquent Real Property
Taxes by Action in Personam, 3 LAw AND Co2xT[P. Pioz. 416, 422 (1936).25T Carlyle, SAXRTOR RESARTuS 22 (Edinburgh Edition 1903).
25 8 See page 263 supra.
259 Act 481 of 1947 § 3, as amended by Act 246 of 1949, PA. STAT. Amr.
tit. 53, § 2015.3 (Supp. 1949). The "aggrieved" taxpayers are those "repre-
senting 25% or more of the total valuation of real estate in the political
subdivision or assessed for taxation purposes, or taxpayers of the political
subdivision not less than 25 in number aggrieved by the ordinance or reso-
lution. . ." Id.
20' Omo GEN. Cooz §§ 12075, 12077 are applicable generally to suits to
recover taxes paid. See Alaska Packers Ass'n. v. Hedenskoy, 267 Fed. 154
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SOME PoLIcY IAMLICATIoNS
It seems faily safe to say at once that considerations of ex-
pediency have had important influence in the resort by a local
government to income taxation. It calls to mind state experience
with the sales tax during the gloomy depression period of the early
1930s. A number of states turned to retail sales taxes during that
period because of the urgent need of revenue without concerning
themselves too much with the broader implications of the levy.
Somewhat parallel has been the resort by a growing number of local
units to income taxation in recent years. The case for the levy has
been more that it is a good. revenue producer than that it is an
equitable method of taxation which fits as well as may be into the
existing tax melange. It is understandable that flat rate income tax
would have its appeal to hard pressed local units.
In support of the flat rate local income tax, several factors can
be mustered. (1) The levy involves the assumption of local re-
sponsibility for raising the money to be expended in local public
administration. There is certainly much to be said for imposing
responsibility for raising local revenue upon those who are to
spend it rather than encouraging resort to state and federal govern-
ments for shared taxes and grants in aid. This point is grounded
upon the assumption that there is a strong nexus between local
responsibility for tax levies and a high quality of stewardship in
local expenditure.
(2) A favorable factor which has already been noted is that the
tax is a good producer. Since it is usually imposed as a flat rate on
gross salaries and wages without exemptions or deductions, it is
not likely, moreover, to be affected as much as a true graduated
net income tax by fluctuations in economic conditions.
(3) The tax enables a local unit to draw some financial support
from so-called "daylight citizens." A municipality as we have seen,
would not have much difficulty in making a substantial case, in
terms of benefits conferred, for taxing non-residents who receive the
benefits of its governmental services from day to day in conducting
their business or professional activities within its confines. 2 1 This is
particularly true of the commuter who does not own taxable prop-
erty within the unit.
(4) The fact that a municipality can reach the daylight citizen
by the levy of an income tax has significant implications with respect
to the relation of peripheral municipalities and unincorporated
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 254 U.S. 652 (1920). (Suit by employee against em-
ployer who withheld tax from wages.)
261 See note 96 -supra. Angell v. Toledo, 153 Ohio St. 179, 91 N.E. 2d 250
(1950) involved-Imposition of the tax. on a non-resident. -.
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suburbs to a primary city. The use of an income tax by the primary
city is calculated to overcome some of the resistance to the extension
of the.city limits to the actual borders of the metropolitan area.2 62.
In our view this is a very favorable factor since we believe that it is
in the public interest to foster the type of metropolitan development
just mentioned. By and large, the boundaries of the primary
general function local unit of government should conform to the
metropolitian area in which services of the type it renders -are ex-
pected to be administered. 263 Not the least objection to the present
unhappy hodgepodge of-local units in a ,given metropolitan area is
the fact that thousands of the best trained and most influential
people of the major community do not live in the primary city and
have no direct political voice in or responsibility for its affairs.
(5) While the tax imposes a considerable burden upon em-
ployers engaged in collection at the source the cost of administration
to the taxing unit is relatively low. In the City of Toledo, Ohio, for
example, the cost has been 3.3c per tax dollar collected.264 This
figure is for the first three years of operation and includes the total
original expense for equipment. There is reason to believe that the
cost will be substantially less during the next three years.
(1) One of the most disturbing criticisms of the local income tax
in the form employed thus far is the charge that the levy is regres-
sive. The levy is not graduated; it is imposed at a flat rate. Most
of the local units which have employed it apply the flat rate to gross
earnings of wage earners and salaried persons without either deduc-
tions or exemptions. In the case of business or professional people,
however, the tax is imposed on net earnings. While we cannot
document the statement, we believe that the general effect of this
is to favor people of larger incomes.
It is clear that the tax is regressive in that it means more as a
deduction from gross income for federal income tax purposes the
greater the income of the individual. The fact that little investment
income has been taxed by local income taxes is favorable to widows
and orphans dependent upon that type of income but, as between
wage earners and people of larger income, the latter are more likely
to have investments and, thus, to enjoy income not affected by the
tax.
A flat tax rate of the sort under scrutiny hardly deserves the
2 6 2 Anderson, Income Tax Aids Annexation, 38 NAT. MuN. Rlr. 443 (1949).
2 3 In the prevalent situation where the primary units' boundaries are
more restricted than those of the metropolitan area, it is well known that
devices such as functional consolidation, service contracts and ad hoc units
are necessarily utilized.
2 04 Report of the Citizens' Income Tax Committee, 34 ToLmo Crry JouRNL
822 (1949). - ,
1950]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
name in modern parlance, of an income tax. The complications of a
graduated levy such as that employed by the Federal Government
would present difficult administrative problems to an ordinary local
unit and it may not be expected to have-the human and other re-
sources required for competent administration of such a tax. The dif-
ficulties of administration of a graduated tax do not provide convinc-
ing justification for a flat rate tax, however, if the operation of the
latter results in serious inequalities. There is an interesting possi-
bility here which was considered in connection with the St. Louis
levy and ultimately rejected.26 5 Where the state itself im-
poses an income tax, local units might be authorized to impose
an additional levy on the income of persons subject to their taxing
jurisdiction. It would constitute a "supplement" to the state levy and
both would be administered by state tax authorities. On that basis
the local unit would bear the responsibility for its levy but the state
would be the administrator and would simply return to the local unit
the fruits of its "tax supplement." Thus, that kind of an arrangement
could be geared to a graduated income levy which made proper
allowance for expenses incurred in producing income, for depen-
dents, and so on.26 6 In this connection it has been observed that a
municipality is too narrow a base for a corporate income tax in view
of the difficulty of allocating corporate income.26 T Toledo and other
cities which have followed her lead have- obviously not considered
this difficulty of allocation insurmountable in levying a flat rate tax,
but that does not, without more, invalidate the objection.
(2) Does a local unit embrace an adequate territorial and
economic base for an individual or corporate income tax? Even at
the state level income producing activity pays little heed to boun-
dary lines on a map. On the local scene this is all the more evident.
The result is that, in the case of residents, there may be taxation
of large "outside" income on a basis not at all proportioned to
benefit, and, in the case of non-residents and corporations, a difficult
problem of allocation of income may be confronted. The cry of "no
taxation without representation" has also been voiced in this
modem context, particularly by non-residents, but we are not dis-
posed to dignify it. In this day taxation without representation is
265 See, PEsissrrv TAxATioN VERsus STATE STisBSY (Missouri Public
Expenditure Survey, January 1948).
266 The Montreal Income Tax, which was based o' a proportion of the
income tax paid to the Dominion, utilized graduated rates. Hillhouse,
Wmm Cmrs GET- TEm Morr 108 (Municipal Finance Officers Association
1945). Mississippi municipal sales taxes are collected by the state tax com-
mission and returned to the cities after deduction of five per centum for cost
of administration. FRom ins- STATE CmrrALs (prepared by Bethune Jones)
May 1950, p. 1.
26T Sly, Tax Supplements For Municipalities, 8 TAX Rsvrsw 7 (1947).
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inevitable; reference to taxation of corporations is enough to make
this clear.
(3) Many of the vagaries of the ad valorem property tax are
common knowledge and its faults in general are so great there is
no disposition here to urge that its use be extended. There is a ques-
tion, however, whether or not the type of local income tax we have
been discussing provides too ready an escape from responsibility to
make the best use of the ad valorem tax system within its present
framework. There is enough information at hand to make one doubt
most seriously whether the general property tax is as productive as it
should be in some of the cities which have levied income taxes. In
Columbus, Ohio, for example, property tax assessments were less in
1948 than they were in 1925.268 At the same time, the tax rate is
one of the lowest in the United States among cities of comparable
size.2 69 It would take electoral approval to increase ad valorem
levies beyond the constitutional 10 mill limit but one might suppose
that the matter of additional revenue to keep essential services
going could be effectively enough brought home to the voters to get
support for a levy required to prevent serious disruption of local
public services. 270 To point to an extreme case, taxable values in
Fayette County, Ohio, in 1948 were approximately 25 per centum
below the 1911 total.271 Ready recourse by a local unit to an earnings
tax is hardly calculated to stimulate efforts to make the most effec-
tive use of the existing ad valorem tax system.
(4) Collection of an earnings tax at the source imposes a heavy
burden upon employers for which, under the usual scheme, no
financial allowance is made. In many instances the expense of
administration imposed upon an employer will exceed the amounts
collected, particularly where it is required that the employer file
information returns on all employees.2 72
(5) The difficulty of getting a complete list of all persons liable
to pay a local income tax, whether they be residents or non-residents
in public or private activities, employees or self-employed, is a
26 In 1925 realty and utility assessments were $464,166,050 and in 1948,
$419,863,020. There has been but little variation in the figure for the inter-
vening years during which prices have increased markedly. Letter to the
writers from Dr. L. E. Smart of the Ohio Department of Taxation dated
May 23, 1950.269 Tax Rates of American Cities 1949, 39 NAT. MuN. REY. 17, 23 (1950).
2 70 Portsmouth, Ohio, was able to obtain electoral approval of such an ad
valorem levy on the understanding that the municipal income tax would be
repealed if the levy passed. See note 5 supra.
271 Columbus (Ohio) Dispatch, March 19, 1950, p. 6 B, Cols. 5, 6.
272 It has been suggested that employers not be required to file informa-
tion returns for employees. Homuth, The Taxpayer Angle on Local Income
Tax Administration, in INcoME TAx ADMINIsTATIOx 329, 346 (Symposium con-
ducted by The Tax Institute 1948).
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drag on enforcement. Unless it is substantially overcome uneven
enforcement, which means unequal taxation, will be the order of
the day..
(8I), A closely-related objection is based on the doubt that most
smaller local units have the resources for efficient income tax admin-
istration. It is a question whether several small levying units can
obviate the difficulty by joining together for the purpose as under
Pennsylvania Act No. 481 as. amended. 273
(7) Another difficulty with local income levies is that in the
absence of some form of reciprocity the same income may be tapped
by more than one local unit. Since the .difficulty can be overcome- by
statute .or by reciprocity provisions in local tax measures, this
objection is not fundamental. in character. It does, however, .present
administrative complications. 274
(8) There has been no effort to think through the implications
of the tax in its relation to the state and federal tax systems. In-
stead, as we have already seen, it sprang from the matrix of ex-
pediency and its impact in distributing the tax burden was not
anticipated in terms of the relation of tax burden to governmental
benefits and to ability to pay.
" These are but a few meagre comments upon policy. The real
task of evaluation remains to be done.
2 73 Act 481 of 1947 § 4, as amended by Act,24 of 1949, PA. STAT. A=x.
tit. 53, § 2015.4.
274 See the discussion of some of the problems presented in, AcT 481:.
ITs. FMST Two ,YEARs OF OrssATioN 21, 22 (Bureau of Municipal Affairs, De-
partment of Internal Affairs of Pennsylvania 1949)..
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